

WHAT IS A *GLOBIE*? A POSTMODERN PHENOMENON OF WORLD MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND CULTURE

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Abstract

We propose the term “globie” as a philosophical neologism that combines ideas of migration and citizenship, which has been steadily getting ground in our increasingly globalized world to the point of acquiring the features of a distinctive culture.

Put provisionally, a globie describes as a type of postmodern person, who moves to different parts of the globe for purposes of employment, creative work, exploration, spirituality, living, due to a value system or simply for adventure. In this sense, a globie in moving from one cultural tradition to another enacts a global cultural encounter in the most immediate sense. A globie is most generally defined by their outlook on the world, which need not be necessarily made explicit or put in a declarative form but could simply be identified as phenomenon according to elements of their lifestyle. Thus, a globie will be characterized by a certain way of thinking and acting, which deploys both worldview and value system.

We start with a preliminary description of the phenomenon, which will provide us with a general working basis for further additions and clarifications. We then relate the concept to the notion of ‘migrant’, into whose category “globie” seems to belong at first glance. Next, we associate globie with a notion of “citizen of the world,” or “cosmopolitan,” which globie seems to emulate in a most literal sense. And finally, we project the notion of the globie in a philosophical perspective where it can be apperceived as a worldview, value system, and culture within certain concepts of the philosophical tradition.¹

Key words: *migration, citizen of the world, culture, cosmopolitanism, postmodern, Diogenes of Sinope, Kant, Simmel, Lévinas, Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty*

No, it is not the mascot of the Haarlem Globetrotters,² though the *globie* we have in mind here can certainly smile. A globie is not just a globetrotter, though world travel and sightseeing could

¹ The idea for this paper was first presented at the 3rd International Colloquium in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture of the Society for Philosophy as Global Conversation, *Global Cultural Encounters: Impacts and Inspirations*, Capacete International Art Residency, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 8-10, 2023.

² <https://www.harlemglobetrotters.com/world-tour/roster/globie/>; <https://mascothalloffame.com/mascots/globie/>

be prominent elements of their lifestyle. Here we will advance the term ‘globie’ as a philosophical neologism describing someone from a distinctive socio-cultural group who conveys a new sense of *migration* and *citizenship*, which has been steadily gaining ground in our increasingly globalized world to the point of acquiring the features of a *culture* at once global and local.

As we see it, a *globie* is most generally defined by their outlook on the world. Of course, this outlook need not be necessarily made explicit nor put in a strict determinate form. It could simply be identified from elements of their lifestyle, which as such remains open to both creativity and change. Insofar as a *globie* is definable by ways of thinking and acting, they are indicative of a *worldview* and a *value system*, which for are key indices of every *culture*.

We proceed phenomenologically. We do not define a “globie” in strict essentialist terms à la Husserl, nor in positivistically or speculatively deployed rationalist terms. The aim is not a comprehensive definition to cover all its particular instantiations. Rather “globie” will be described within a more flexible hermeneutic perspective utilizing critical, pragmatist, existentialist, and deconstructionist terms, which would allow us to identify its key aspects in a variety of instances while at the same time self-consciously avoiding the dogmatism that may accrue in the process. Thus, our sense of “globie,” and indeed of its putative “essence” that a phenomenological approach anticipates methodically, will remain open for additions, reinvention, as well as for deconstruction when the term becomes obsolete, its relevance fades, or its meaning is trivialized. Before that, though, “globie” will need to be placed on the stage to make it visible and its rise conspicuous.³

Hence, we shall first endeavor a preliminary description of the phenomenon, which will provide us with a general, even if crude, working basis for further additions and clarifications. We shall then discuss its essentialist features as well as its hermeneutic openness. We shall further try to relate “globie” to “migrant,” which the term appears to fit most closely. We shall also bring in the notion of being “a citizen of the world,” which has gained a clear footing in the philosophical tradition and which a *globie* appears to emulate. Finally, we shall recapitulate our findings on the *globie* philosophically as a worldview, value system, and, indeed, culture.

A Preliminary Description

This description will be very much empirical; after all, it points to a phenomenon of culture that has already taken a certain shape. As already suggested, the description being offered here of “globie” would not amount – neither on their own, nor cumulatively – to the “essence” of their object; rather, they will convey the difference that *globie* makes compared to other related cultural phenomena. Thus, being in an important sense phenomenological and non-essentialist at once, our approach will allow us to produce an account of the phenomenon in question that retains the sense of its arbitrariness and possible deconstruction. In this way, the significance of the phenomenon will become appreciable most of all in the specific contexts in which it is

³ On the visual metaphors employed in phenomenological thinking, see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York, London: Harper & Row, 1962), especially pp. 49-63; cf. with *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemayer Verlag GmbH & Co, 1993), SS. 27-39.

meaningfully actualized – in the manner of the latter Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “language games”⁴ – without its apperception amounting to the status of definitive general or metaphysical “essence” in the classic absolutist sense of the term.

What can be said about a globie at first glance is that they come from one cultural tradition to enter another. A globie thus appears to us as someone moving around the globe and as a carrier of a global cultural encounter in a most immediate sense of the term. A globie is a peculiar type of modern-day (indeed, postmodern) person who can move to another part of the world for purposes of employment, studies, research, creative work, spirituality, living, relaxation, exploration, love, peace, or simply adventure (etc). Any of these reasons to move around the globe would suffice to qualify someone as a globie (and here we do not exclude the possibility of inter-planetary globies), and these reasons are also commonly found in combination. At this stage, we may take the empirical constataion of “someone moving around the globe” as a working definition of a globie, but the term requires further specification. For, in a literal sense, all earthlings move around the globe. In particular, we need to exclude ‘moving around the neighborhood or the metro area’, which has the character of a commute. To clarify our idea, let us consider a few of the more likely representatives.

a) The Global Professional

Moving to a fairly distant geographic location to start a new job has long since stopped causing any major surprise. Indeed, the situation in which someone would leave for work in the morning and return back home in the evening has been increasingly modified by home relocations, to which we will add that distances to work places and home relocations have become more radical over time.

Corporate multinationals have been aware of the need of such mobility for highly skilled specialists as well as unskilled workers for quite some time, but professionals have made such choices on an individual level as well. Thus, engineers and high-tech experts, managers and staffers, doctors and nurses, teachers and academics, pilots and flight attendants, activists and aid workers, athletes and coaches, digital nomads and freelancers, to cite a few examples, have found their work-place well outside their initial socio-cultural habitat. To these we also add a number of professions who – with the expansion of the opportunities for online work – today have ever more options for moving around the globe. Over the course of time, all of the above-mentioned have been increasing in numbers, with delimitations of town, city, county, state, and continent posing fewer and fewer challenges to these moves.

We will need to clarify, though, that employment-driven globies are not reducible to typical economic migrants as their kind of migration involves a higher level of individual autonomy. While global professionals are indeed economic migrants in that they do on the whole move around the globe seeking a better place for themselves in the global economy, but they can also be distinguished from many other economic migrants who are precipitated by vital economic necessity. Global professionals are primarily motivated by reasons of professional and personal development, and the border between decision factors cannot be

⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), especially #3, #7, #23.

strictly demarcated. As to economic migrants as a category, a great number of them can be subsumed under the term “global professional,” if we understand “professional” to refer to a skilled or occupationally trained person. But our focus here is specifically on the global professional that, apart from responding to their own economic needs or the needs of their employer, find it beneficial or otherwise important to enhance their personal and professional skills by acquiring *a distinctly global experience*, something that motivated a move well-outside their original dwelling locality.

The global professional is, therefore, that special type of economic migrant who is very much driven by self-motivation and self-actualization, rather than by external factors. They include people who have *realized the need and made the choice of expanding and enriching themselves in an encounter with other cultures in order to prepare, develop, and recreate themselves as persons ready for future challenges and achievements*. We can therefore distinguish a *free spirit* as a fundamental characteristic of their ethos. And, equally, we assert that the *free spirit* out of which one moves around the globe is characteristic of what we would like to call ‘the culture of the globie’.

Thus, we could say that, on the whole, in their moving around the globe, global professionals are carriers of cultural encounters and contribute to a culture that in itself grows up as inclusive of other cultures; that is, a culture that can accommodate the global into the local and vice versa.

b) The Art Resident

The free spirit of the globie is perhaps most articulately exemplified by the art resident. *Creative art work has long been* a motive for a move outside one’s habitat. Artists of various kinds, visual or performing, writers or composers, actors or directors have searched for inspiration in the hills of Provence, the coasts of the Pacific islands, the mountains of Kyrgyzstan,⁵ or simply taken up the prospects on offer by one of the numerous art residences around the globe.⁶ It has been suggested that such outings or breaks between intense work are conducive to artistic productivity as the case seemed to be with Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque.⁷ One thing that can be noted immediately is that such moves can extend over the relatively local to the markedly global, from short, long-term to permanent, thus stretching the notion of ‘art resident’.

The vitality of the association between travel and productivity is undiminished whether or not this migration has been precipitated by life events, economic concerns, political factors, or, indeed, fully self-actualized. Indeed, the novelty of the cultural experience has played a qualitative role in the production of many creative works. For example, the results of Paul Gauguin relocating from France to Latin America, Martinique, and Tahiti; Lafcadio Hearn’s residence in Greece, Ireland, France, England, United States, French Indies, and Japan; Charlie Chaplin in England, United States, Switzerland, and Bali; Marguerite Duras’ travels between Indochina and France; Amélie Nothomb journeys across Europe, Asia, and America.

⁵ A case in point here is Shaarbek Amankul’s *Nomadic Art Camp Project: The Land where Horses Run Free*, <https://www.top-ev.de/screenings/event-nomadic-art-camp-project-the-land-where-horses-run-free/>

⁶ Consider, for instance, the arts residency network maintained by organization like *Res Artis*, <https://resartis.org/>

⁷ Howard E. Gardner, *Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi* (New York: Basic Books, 2011), pp. 155-156.

In the present day, many are drawn by the established centers of artistic culture, such as Paris, Vienna, Florence, Berlin, St. Petersburg, or Barcelona, but also newer centers like New York, São Paulo, Beijing, Cape Town, San Francisco, Kyoto, and Leipzig, which contribute a more global touch to artistic exchanges. Regardless of the distance, there are numerous examples of painters, writers, composers, musicians, dancers, actors, directors, designers, architects who would attest to the correctness of the decision they have taken to further their artistic development. Regardless of the primary motive, art residents too have therefore contributed to globie culture, its inclusivity, as well as its reinvention of the global and the local.

c) Values-driven Globies

Values, including *spiritual* motives, have motivated a move to another part of the globe. While religious and political migrants constitute the majority, refugees from war zones should also be counted here. While this type of migration – be it temporary or permanent – may not always be voluntary, so long as the aim is a more meaningful life (as apperceived within the terms of their value convictions), such migrants have been regarded as being lofty or noble in spirit. Their worldviews can be systematically presented.

If we are to categorize the values-driven globies of today, they can be divided into three main groups. The first group are spiritual and religious globies, whose worldview for the most part has its origins in Antiquity. The second group have an ideological character and have their instantiations in Modernity, which may have a religious or spiritual aspect nonetheless. The third group are critical thinkers and as such are characteristic of the postmodern mindset which draw upon Modernity and Antiquity. It is also often the case that these three types of groups each adopt aspects and viewpoints from the others, and thus co-exist with one another in an exchange we call “global conversation.”

People have travelled as pilgrims to the holy places associated with the worldview that inaugurated their value system. Short, long-term, or permanent, they have moved for the purpose of upholding their religious and spiritual values. As in the past so today, Buddhists have visited the places that originated their spiritual worldview in India and Tibet, while Jewish people have settled in Israel, the Holy Land of their religion. Pilgrimage is an important aspect of Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Buddhist destinations include Lumbini and Sarnath; Jewish, the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem; Muslim, the cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, which attracting millions every year. Jerusalem is also the holiest site for Christians, while Eastern Orthodox pilgrims choose to visit Hagia Sophia and Mount Athos, and Catholics, Rome, Santiago de Compostela, among many other places.

As for globies motivated by ideology and politics, their migration often across different political systems is not always voluntary. For example, political dissidents from authoritarian states pushed by political persecution to well-established constitutional democracies. Yet, it should be noted, there are globies who move in the opposite direction as well. Internationalization and globalization have played their part particularly in the migration of activists. For other globies in this category, even the sense of living in an environment closer to one’s ideological, political, or economic beliefs has proven sufficient motive for relocation.

With respect to globies who move due to a critical mindset which opens them to consider other issues at stake, including purposes of learning, self-development, and self-

creation, and who are particularly well-prepared for a move to another part of the globe, one might think them adaptable enough *not* to have to move. Indeed, they are distinct from the previous two groups in the high level of autonomy they demonstrate. The post-modern age has witnessed a spectacular rise in numbers of these people who move out of due consideration of the merits. For these people; that is, the postmodern globies, values like, come to prominence as fundamentals of a critical thought that seeks resolutions. These globies are of primary interest here, who, typically, in valuing tolerance, democracy, equality, social and environmental justice, solidarity, and empathy, appear to be particularly suited for role-models for carriers of global cultural encounters.

In today's world, there are many who chose to relocate in order to join socio-cultural communities more in sympathy with their values, or alternative communities through which they might explore a different belief system or spirituality. While an association with the like-minded and like-spirited are of great importance generally to all three groups, we will emphasize that the third group, that is, the postmodern critical mindset, has a greater willingness to explore a range of beliefs to the extent that they are not only able but also willing to revisit and rethink their initial value system: They are happy simply to move around the globe for the sake of learning, self-knowledge, and self-creation.

d) Other Globies

The above attempt at taxonomic differentiation is by no means exhaustive. It is only meant to throw light on the diversity of globies by pointing out the more readily recognizable types. There are many other people moving around the globe who do not fall into these categories. At this point, it is important to acknowledge that the denizens of the post-modern world often find themselves exploring unknown territories (in all senses of the term), not just through travel, but also by relocating to them temporarily or permanently. This could be part of their own way of life, or in partnership with the environmental or socio-cultural community with which they associate. One could simply be searching for more opportunities, just as people from poverty stricken parts of the globe have sought for a better life elsewhere. One could be looking for a place to relax for purposes of health and recreation. One could be seeking out adventure out of the desire to overcome challenges, to experience the unknown for purposes to test or improve oneself.

The motives of globies are varied, and may not conform to standards of moral goodness. Yet, considering the importance of making the world a better and happier place for its inhabitants, the post-modern globie that we will focus on here can be further elaborated on as a *role model*, that is, the carrier of a positive global cultural encounter, of global social change and progress, of a sustainable contribution to what Richard Rorty not too long ago advocated as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.”^{8 9} Therefore, we will devote the rest of our discussion here to the globie who can become a viable *role model* of global cultural

⁸ Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics” in *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 20-21ff.

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of Rorty's view, see Rossen Roussev, “Global Conversation on the Spot: What Lao-tse, Heidegger, and Rorty Have in Common,” *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 1 (2018), pp. 30ff.

encounters, and, thus, the harbinger and carrier of a *new affirmative global culture* that could facilitate our happy coexistence.

Essential Features of the Globie

The preliminary description given above will be employed to determine the essential features of the globie understood here as a philosophical neologism. As a first step, we will identify what these globies have in common. We have already suggested that globies share an outlook on the world and that moving around the globe is their defining characteristic. Discernable in the phenomenon of the globie are features ranging from concrete to abstract, whose proper discussion demands a flexible terminology that could convey equally well literal and metaphorical meanings.

To this end, let us refer to the distinction between *home* and *journey*, which we had explored before.¹⁰ Speaking philosophically, the specific point that we would like to make is that in each case *for a globie* “*home*” and “*journey*” largely coincide, or, at the very least, for them, there is a greater coincidence between ‘home’ and ‘journey’ than for someone else. Globies feel at home undertaking their journey; they feel at home settling in a new region; they feel at home undertaking a second journey, and when settling in a second region, and so on. While ‘home’ and ‘journey’ can be understood in their ordinary senses, it should also be borne in mind that they can carry a more abstract and metaphorical sense, as in their usage by thinkers like Herodotus, Lao-tse, Plato, Aristotle, Novalis, Martin Heidegger, or Emmanuel Lévinas.¹¹
¹² To convey the essential aspects of the globie more clearly, we need to elucidate the relation between the ordinary sense of these terms and their more abstract and metaphorical Heideggerian sense.

In the ordinary sense, “home” is conceived as a dwelling place to which one returns upon taking care of one’s daily tasks. Essential features of the home are that it is lasting and ensures one’s continuous shelter, recuperation, existence, and well-being. Thus, “home” is a point of departure and return. For its part, “journey” is delimited by departure from and return to “home,” with which in this sense it forms an opposition. In the same sense, a journey’s characteristic features are that it has a beginning and end, and that chronologically it endures between them. “Journey” is thus a straying away from home, which can be prompted by any of the purposes that motivate the globie’s itinerancy, and when it ends, it typically ends back home again.

¹⁰ Rossen Roussev, “Thinking and Philosophizing as the Journey of Waying and Homecoming: Heidegger, Lao-tse, and Herodotus,” *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 2 (2019), pp. 20-42.

¹¹ For a discussion of this usage in Herodotus, Lao-Tse, and Heidegger, see *ibid.*, pp. 20-42, <http://philogc.org/vol-2/>.

¹² For a discussion covering the usage in question in Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Novalis, Heidegger, and Lévinas, see Tomokazu Baba, “Philosophy as Journey,” *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 2 (2019), pp. 12-14, <http://philogc.org/vol-2/>.

The coincidence between “home” and “journey,” which we suggest here as forming the essence of a globie has also an extra-ordinary metaphorical sense.¹³ This sense combines the comfort associated with home and the joy associated with journey, such that the journey becomes comfortable to the point that one’s journey feels home-like. This juxtaposition of the terms “home” and “journey” with “comfort” and “joy” respectively may at first appear arbitrary, as examples of home and journey being stressful and sad easily comes to mind. But the idea we are trying to convey here is rather Nietzschean; that is, positive in the sense of *life-affirming*, promoting *joy* as the noble value which can imbue “journey,” “home,” and *comfort* in the celebration of the becoming to whose dynamics they may properly belong.¹⁴

Heidegger’s usage of the metaphors of “home” and “way,” especially in his latter thought, offers a perspective for clarifying the more abstract sense of the coincidence between “home” and “journey” that we see as the essential characteristic of the “globie” as a phenomenon. For Heidegger, thinking and philosophizing are motivated by the essential *homelessness* (*Unheimlichkeit*) of the human being (*Dasein*), whereas the act of their carrying on, he rendered metaphorically as *waying* in the sense of a search for *home*, or *homecoming*.¹⁵ Here, Heidegger’s terms can help us understand the existential-phenomenological sense of the essence of globie, suggesting that, at home, the globie feels not-at-home, and not at home, the globie feels at-home. We can use this distinction to spell out the coincidence of home and journey in the globie as follows: *globie is at(-)home in journey and journey is their (coveted) home*. The globie in these terms is a paradoxical phenomenon, which we will continue to discuss from a postmodern perspective where it will be represented as hermeneutically open-ended.

For now, the globie, can be left as a phenomenon apperceived within the terms of home, journey, waying, and homecoming. But just as the literal and metaphorical lacks a fixed border between them, and therefore can become an issue for philosophical discussion, the sense of what a globie is can fluctuate, as it inevitably does existentially. It fluctuates somewhere between (but not necessarily limited to) those of *traveler*, *settler*, *migrant*, *explorer*, *missionary*, and *philosophical subject*. As far as the globie is delineated here, we can perceive the likes of Marco Polo, Thor Heyerdahl, Jacques Cousteau, Mother Teresa, and René Descartes as globies. We leave off the present investigation by emphasizing that the globie in moving from one cultural tradition to another is a carrier of a global cultural encounter, both literally and metaphorically. In this, “globie” readily associates with two further socio-cultural phenomena, “migrant” and “citizen of the world,” which we will deal with next.

¹³ On the philosophical virtues of *metaphor*, see Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics” in *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially pp. 12-17ff.

¹⁴ See for instance Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols Or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer*, translated by Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), #5, p. 91; cf. *Götzen-Dämmerung, oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert*, in *Nietzsche’s Werke*, Bänd VIII (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1899), # 5, SS. 173-174.

¹⁵ For a more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s both early and latter views of “way,” “waying,” “home” and “homecoming,” see Rossen Roussev, “Thinking and Philosophizing as the Journey of Waying and Homecoming: Heidegger, Lao-tse, and Herodotus,” pp. 22ff.

The Globie as a Postmodern Migrant

A key observation for us is that globie is content not only with moving around the globe but also with settling for fairly long periods of time at places that are fairly distant from their original habitat. In this regard, rather than a commuter, traveler, or sightseer, a globie is a migrant. A globie however is a peculiar type of migrant, and we will draw attention to what differentiates the globie as a migrant keeping in mind that the terms of this clarification may vacillate between their literal, metaphorical, and philosophical meanings.

As already noted, not forced on the move by socio-historical circumstances, a globie is different from the typical refugee, economic or political migrant, which is not to say they might not have been one of them. A globie is largely a migrant *by choice*, and as far this is a choice it can be conceived as an act of self-determination along the lines of what Nietzsche once called “giving a style to one’s character.”¹⁶

Nevertheless, movement in its literal sense does not entirely define a globie. Globies could move not only many times, just once, but also *never*. They are not overly concerned with leaving their original abode any more than arriving at a future one. When one is a migrant primarily by choice, each new place is equally a home. Rather than a mathematical quality, “equally” here gestures to the globie’s essence. Technically, a globie could feel at home anywhere since “home” and “journey” essentially coincide for them. Thus, globie can emulate the sense of traveler, settler, or Heideggerian existential subject alike, as a *globie is continually homecoming*. We have thereby arrived at our postmodern sense of migration: migrancy is not leaving a home, but a state of homecoming.

When “home” and “journey” coincide, home always seems *new*. This newness also applies to the globie’s employer, which the globie serves according to their own conviction. (The conviction of both parties may be different.) The globie’s conviction is at the bottom a commitment to serve oneself, people, and the world. This conviction may be explicit on the globie’s mind, or performatively demonstrated in practice. Regardless, as conviction is an intrinsic aspect of the globie’s self-creation, a globie is as much themselves as what they are doing.

A globie is also what they think. We have already pointed to their self-determining character, and thinking has historically been understood as deliberate.¹⁷ While a globie may be defined by a certain way of thinking, it is truly thinking itself that already marks the birth of the globie. For, in thinking, one inevitably entertains both *global and local significations*¹⁸ and can be taken as moving around the globe in a metaphorical sense. Thus, one who thinks is a globie. Even though our stretches of thought do differ, thinking takes us on a journey where *truth* is a homecoming.

¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), #290, pp. 232-233; cf. *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft: (“a gaya Scienza”)* (Leipzig : E. W. Fritsch, 1887), #290, S. 207.

¹⁷ Kant’s moral philosophy is based on this assumption which inheres his principle of autonomy of the free will and his categorical imperative. See, Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1988), p. 44; cf. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, herausgegeben von Karl Vorländer (Leipzig, Dürr’schen Buchhandlung, 1906), S. 67.

¹⁸ For a discussion on the relation between global and local, see Rossen Roussev, “Global Conversation on the Spot: What Lao-tse, Heidegger, and Rorty Have in Common,” pp. 11-38.

Thus, from a phenomenological perspective, a globie can be determined by what they do and think. A globie is a migrant not only in a literal sense but also in a metaphorical or philosophical sense. Which is why in our view the presence of the globie can be legitimately attested to from both a physical and metaphysical perspective.

The Globie as a Citizen of the World

In the Western cultural tradition, there is the notion of “a citizen of the world” which can help us grasp the globie as a phenomenon. We shall draw attention to a number of philosophical perspectives that have elaborated on what we have here termed the globie. Even though there is no unified understanding, these conceptual frameworks will help concretize our sense of the globie.

a) Diogenes of Sinope’s “Cosmopolite”

The 4th century BC thinker, Diogenes the Cynic, is said to have answered the question of where he comes from by saying “I am a citizen of the world (κοσμοπολίτης).”¹⁹ This is the first recorded usage of the term which, apart from opening the formative perspective of what later came to be known as *cosmopolitanism*, was also indicative of Diogenes’ specific situation of exile and way of thinking. What we know about him comes from various fragmented sources from which we may arrive at his sense of κοσμοπολίτης. Of particular relevance are the reports of his peculiar lifestyle: he believed actions matter more than words, regularly pointing to the discrepancies between what his contemporaries said and did.

Referring to his state of exile (from Sinope), Diogenes not only asserted “it was through that ... that I came to be a philosopher,” but also sentenced his exilers to “home-staying.”²⁰ It was he who also made the remarkable claim that the most beautiful thing in the world is “the freedom of speech.”²¹ Adopting the ascetics of his teacher Antisthenes, he led a lifestyle marked by austerity and simplicity. He defied cultural conventions, which in his view were opposed to the ways of nature. He lived in a barrel. He adapted well to his exile in Athens, and even when he was later abducted and sold as a slave to Corinth, he was able to navigate a position for himself as tutor to the sons of his master. He was satisfied enough to reject offers from friends to buy him off slavery. Indeed, he asked to be buried with his master’s sons.²²

Diogenes was often called “the dog” (the followers of Antisthenes were generally referred to as *cynics*, literally, “dog-like”). Not only did he not mind the soubriquet, nor, in fact dogs, which he regarded as positive examples of an unpretentious living in accordance with nature. He even went so far as to identify with a dog claiming: “I fawn on those who give me anything, I yelp at those who refuse, and I set my teeth in rascals,”²³ and, “Other dogs bite their

¹⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol. 2, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), Book VI, 49, pp. 64-65.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Book VI, 63, pp. 50-51.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Book VI, 69, pp. 70-71.

²² *Ibid.*, Book VI, 29-31, pp. 30-33; 74-75, pp. 76-77.

²³ *Ibid.*, Book VI, 60, pp. 62-63.

enemies, but I my friends, so as to save them.”²⁴ When he passed, his gravestone was adorned with a marble dog, and in sculpture as well as painting he is frequently accompanied by dogs.

We find a special significance in Diogenes’ “citizen of the world,” as reflected in his dog virtues, ability to make a home in a barrel, power of persuasion, and high valuation of free speech. Diogenes’ openness to the animal world is a radical openness to the Other: his cosmopolitanism is simply a consequence of this openness. We also note the characteristic mobility of his chosen place of living and see it as integral to the extension of his sense of community to the world, that is, his sense of belonging to a global community, which was something well beyond the grasp of his fellows Athenians and Corinthians, whose limited communal outlook he associated with the stasis of their domiciles (*Immobilie*). His mobility is connected to his adaptability, and, by his own recognition, his becoming a philosopher with the capacity to persuade and educate. Last but not least, the importance he placed on freedom of speech, which not only facilitates dialogue, but as a consequence enables education, cultivation, and cultural exchange. We think these aspects of Diogenes’ life and thought as the preconditions for the possibility of a “citizen of the world,” in other words, of a sustainable cosmopolitan culture.

b) Immanuel Kant on the Citizen of the World and Universal Hospitality

Immanuel Kant too discussed the notion of a “citizen of the world” (*Weltbürger*) as an ethical and political concept. Most notably, he raised the idea in connection with the possibility of maintaining “perpetual peace” (*ewigen Frieden*) between nation states. It comes into play in such ideas his as “cosmopolitan law” (*Weltbürgerrecht*), “cosmopolitan society” (*weltbürgerliche Gesellschaft*), “cosmopolitan system” (*weltbürgerlichen Zustand*), “cosmopolitan goal” (*weltbürgerlicher Absicht*), “cosmopolitan constitution” (*weltbürgerlichen Verfassung*), “common human world-state” (*allgemeinen Menschenstoats*, or *jus cosmopoliticum*), “cosmopolitan union” (*weltbürgerlichen Vereinigung*), and “universal hospitality” (*allgemeinen Hospitalität*).²⁵

Influenced by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Kant believed that the manner in which the state of nature of “war of all against all” is overcome by the establishment of a political state can be applied to the relations between nations to ensure their

²⁴ Diogenes the Cynic, *Sayings and Anecdotes with Other Popular Moralists*, trans. Robin Hard (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), #87.

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, trans. Mary C. Smith (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1917); cf. *Zum ewigen Frieden, Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, herausgegeben von Karl Vorländer (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1919). *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); cf. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, herausgegeben von Karl Vorländer (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1912). “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,’” trans. H. B. Nisbet, in Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant’s Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 41-53, pp. 61-92; cf. “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,” *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, November, 1784, SS. 385-411; “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis,” *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, September, 1793, SS. 201–284; or Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelten Werken* (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1902–1938), Bände VII-VIII, elektronischen Edition at https://web.archive.org/web/20190905203834fw_/https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/verzeichnisse-gesamt.html.

co-existence in perpetual peace. Where in the former case this required a republican state regulating human relations by the means of a system of law, in the latter case, this would be achieved by a system of international law (*Völkerrecht*).²⁶ This suggests the necessity of some kind of a union or federation of independent states, and still further, a cosmopolitan or world order.²⁷ Kant reasoned that such an international relation was a goal which humanity needed to strive towards. Kant also claimed human actions were in practice governed by universal moral laws. Rational beings who adopt that law act in his view both as legislators and legislated to ensure a “kingdom of ends” (*Reich der Zwecke*), the realm in which they can co-exist consistently, compatibly, and peacefully together moral subjects.²⁸ In this way, the “cosmopolitan state” aligns with the “kingdom of the ends” in that their respective subjects – the “citizen of the world” and the “moral agent” – are one and the same subject acting under universal laws.

Kant believed that humanity is capable of attaining perpetual peace in international affairs under which the “citizen of the world” is legitimized in universalistic terms. A key provision of his perspective was that “The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.”²⁹ For Kant, universal hospitality referred to a form of hospitality that was conditional and restricted the rights of individuals as citizens of the world. For example, he believed that a nation state should host foreigners if their stay was temporary and their intentions benign.³⁰ This would enhance trade relations between nations and help them realize that peace is a more profitable state of international affairs than war.³¹

Clearly, Kant’s concept of world citizenship was quite limited offering no more than a pragmatic justice that maintained nation states in their relations with one another. Nevertheless, the connections Kant forges between world citizenship and peace, justice, hospitality, and profit is laudable. However limiting his concept of a “kingdom of ends,” it is a key contribution to the ethico-political culture of modernity, which upholds a rational and economically justified need for the nation states to open their borders, to establish a more universal system of law, and to embrace cosmopolitanism for the sake of peace and prosperity.

c) Georg Simmel’s Stranger

Georg Simmel provides a remarkable and insightful analysis of the “stranger” (*der Fremde*), the outsider who joins an in-group.³² His work explores the concept of mobility, objectivity, openness, freedom, proximity, and distance, as well as the relationships the stranger forms with

²⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, pp. 133-136; cf. *Zum ewigen Frieden*, SS. 19-20.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129, 134-136, 155-156, 189ff; cf. SS. 16-17, 19-21, 33-34, 51ff.

²⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 39-44, 61; cf. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, SS. 59-66, 93-94 .

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 137; cf. *Zum ewigen Frieden*, S. 21.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-139; cf. SS. 21-22.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112, 148-149, 157; cf. SS. 6-7, 28-29, 34.

³² Georg Simmel, “The Stranger,” *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. Kurt Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), pp. 402-408; cf. “Exkurs über den Fremden,” *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (München; Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922), SS. 509-512.

members of the local community. Simmel's discussion also distinguishes literal and metaphorical meanings of 'globie'.

For Simmel, mobility or "wandering" is, on the one hand, "liberation" from a certain "point in space," and, on the other hand, "the conceptional opposite to fixation at such a point," both of which make up the sociological unity of the 'stranger'.³³ He sees "spatial relations" as both the "condition" and the "symbol" of the "human relations," which suggests that this term has both literal and metaphorical aspects that can also be read in his characterization of "human relations" as a "unity of nearness and remoteness" exemplified in "the phenomenon of the stranger."³⁴ Thus, not only can a stranger be near or remote in space literally, but "in the relationship to him, distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually near."³⁵ Still, Simmel regards the stranger not as someone who just comes and goes, but as someone "who comes today and stays tomorrow" to become part of the local community.³⁶ And whereas stranger's place in that community "is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning," Simmel thinks of the relation with a stranger as "very positive" and as "a specific form of interaction" that contributes to the community, which would not have this benefit prior to the stranger's arrival.³⁷ In this regard, Simmel has also associated the mobility of the stranger with another peculiar fact, namely, that the stranger is "no owner of soil" and that their economic presence is typically in the area of "trade," giving as an example "the history of European Jews" and pointing out that the different taxation applied to them.³⁸

Simmel also draws attention to the characteristic "objectivity of the stranger," which he associates with openness, freedom, and unbiased judgement. For Simmel, this trait of the stranger, apart from being again a "particular structure composed of distance and nearness," points to the stranger's peculiar status of "indifference and involvement," which is an advocacy for the stranger as a judge that is "free from entanglement" with local interests.³⁹ For the same reason, the stranger is also the preferred confidante for matters one would not discuss with one's close ones, which points to stranger's "openness" and is yet another "positive participation" within the local community.⁴⁰ In a sense, Simmel sees objectivity as "freedom" consisting in the lack of "commitments which could prejudice" our "perception, understanding, and evaluation of the given,"⁴¹ (a view which was a harbinger of Heidegger's latter assertion that "the essence of truth is freedom").⁴² In Simmel's view, the stranger "is freer practically and

³³ Ibid., p. 402; cf. S. 509.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 402; cf. S. 509.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 402; cf. S. 509.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 402; cf. S. 509.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 402; cf. S. 509.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 403, 407-408; cf. SS. 509-510, 512.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 404; cf. S. 510.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 404; cf. S. 510.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 405; cf. S. 510.

⁴² Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," *Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition, edited by David F. Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 115-138; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe I*, Bänd XIV (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1976), SS. 177-202.

theoretically” to review and judge the matters at stake more objectively, “with less prejudice” and no dependence on “habit, piety, and precedent.”⁴³

Simmel also discusses the sense of stranger’s “nearness and distance” in the more abstract terms of qualities which the stranger may or may not have in common with the locals. In his view, with a stranger, we typically have “more general qualities in common,” unlike with members of our community, with whom we share “specific differences.”⁴⁴ We get closer to a stranger when we share “common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature,” whereas we feel distance with them once we realize that what we share is also shared by “a great many people.”⁴⁵ Simmel suggests that this sense of distance may also “enter even the most intimate relationships,” even as the lovers are unwilling to admit that anything could compare to their feelings for each other, and that this would typically happen “when this feeling of uniqueness vanishes from the relationship.”⁴⁶ But whereas in Simmel’s view “strangeness” of this kind “is probably not absent in any relation,” it is still different from the person who “rejects the very commonness” from the outset and thus reduces the possibility of a “positive relation” with the stranger to a “non-relation,” as the case might have been with the ancient Greek’s radical self-differentiation from the “barbarian.”⁴⁷

All in all, Simmel regards the stranger as “an organic member of the group,” despite the stranger’s “inorganic” attachment to it as a newcomer.⁴⁸ The novelty that the stranger introduces into the group has the potential to increase the productivity of the group as a whole. But the concept is limiting in that it is bound to an established and geographically delimited native community in which the stranger is largely appropriated in accordance with the needs and conditions of that community. Nonetheless, Simmel at least suggests the stranger’s positive role in bringing to the community a distinctive mobility, objectivity, openness, freedom, and productivity.

d) Emmanuel Lévinas on the Other and Justice

The 20th century philosopher of ethics Emmanuel Lévinas has offered a postmodern perspective on the relationship between the self and the other, which we find very relevant to our notion of “globie.” He actualizes two dimensions in that relationship, namely, the moral-ethical and social-political, and specifies their connection via his concept of justice.^{49 50}

⁴³ Georg Simmel, “The Stranger,” p. 405; cf. “Exkurs über den Fremden,” SS. 510-511.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 405; cf. S. 511.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 406; cf. S. 511.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 406; cf. SS. 511-512.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 406-407; cf. SS. 511-512.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 408; cf. S. 512.

⁴⁹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998); cf. *Totalité et infini Essai sur l’extériorité* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1999); cf. *Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).

⁵⁰ For a more detailed discussion of this connection, see Rossen I. Roussev, “Between Ethics and Politics: An Essay on Lévinas’ Philosophy of Justice,” *Sofia Philosophical Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011), pp. 83-110.

Maintaining that “metaphysics precedes ontology” and designates the self’s desire for grasping “exteriority” and “infinity,” Lévinas dismisses traditional philosophy’s aspiration to “totality,” which he also detects in Heidegger’s prioritization of the question of Being.⁵¹ For Lévinas, the metaphysical relation to exteriority is first initiated by the self’s relation to the other, which is fundamentally an ethical relation.⁵² This means that the self relates to the other ethically prior to any ontology; that is, prior to any discussion of concepts like being, time, history, essence, or truth. Thus, in its origin in exteriority, the ethical relation appears self-sufficient in the sense that it needs no other legitimators than itself. It is a relation of a response on the part of the Self to the Other, which need not be mediated in terms of Being, including by any rationally formulated universal moral law à la Kant. Instead, this response is in its essence a responsibility for another, which is unconditional and which itself becomes the condition for all ontology.

For Lévinas, the role of the subject in the ethical relation is determined precisely by its responsibility for the other, which is also a recognition of the other as the subject’s master in their face-to-face encounter.⁵³ In this sense, within the grammatical metaphors Lévinas uses in his latter work, the subject is placed “in accusative” as nominated by the other and is thereby deprived of its foundational role as the free pursuer of truth in freedom anticipated in ontology.⁵⁴ The subject is indeed necessary for ethics, which will not be possible without its response to another. For Lévinas, the subject can be conducive to ethics, that is, can become an ethical subject, precisely and only when inaugurated by another.

In Lévinas’ view, the self-sufficient ethical relation is disturbed by the presence of what he calls the “third party” (*le tiers*), which he associates with justice.⁵⁵ The third is the introduction of the social dimension to the ethical relation and indicates its presence in the proximity of the other. For Lévinas, the third is justice seen as the necessity of “comparison, coexistence, contemporaneity, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and intellect, the intelligibility of a system.”⁵⁶ For him this means that justice reintroduces in the primordial ethical relation the culture of being, truth, knowledge, and laws, all pointing to the social complexity of the ethical and compelling the self to heed them in its subjection to the other. But as the Self does not issue from the ontology of Being but from its position of accusative in relation to the Other, the “order” of justice is now apperceived in extra-ordinary terms like “third man,” “infinity,” “illeity,” and “prophecy.”⁵⁷

For Lévinas, the presence of the third party does not diminish the Self’s responsibility for the Other. On the contrary, it makes that responsibility even greater, as the Self is not entirely certain how the Other is related to the Third. The Self is also responsible for the Third but

⁵¹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 42ff; cf. *Totalité et infini*, pp. 32ff.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; cf. p. 77.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 79ff; cf. pp. 67, 78ff.

⁵⁴ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being*, especially, pp. 11, 15, 43, 53, 85, 106, 110-112, 121-124, 142, 146; cf. *Autrement qu’être*, pp. 26, 31, 74, 91, 135, 167, 174-177, 193-197, 222, 228.

⁵⁵ For a more detailed discussion of the topic of justice in Lévinas, see Rossen I. Roussev, “Between Ethics and Politics: An Essay on Lévinas’ Philosophy of Justice,” pp. 83-110.

⁵⁶ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being*, p. 157; cf. *Autrement qu’être*, p. 245.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 150; cf. pp. 234-235.

cannot entirely answer for the latter, for whom it can only demand justice.⁵⁸ Thus, in Lévinas' view, the self is also necessary for justice, including bringing being, truth, knowledge, comparison, and culture into the ethical relation. But as it issues from, is apperceived in, and remains bound to the primordial ethical relation, justice in its proper sense is imbued with the ethical and is the carrier of the ethical into the rest of culture. Likewise, as it originates beyond being, justice is a judgment that is not based on any subjective foundation, nor on any principle formulated in terms of subjective or historical time, but is "anarchic" in that it is made against the horizon of infinite time.⁵⁹

Lévinas' philosophy can be seen as a radical critique of the Western philosophy in his aim to establish "ethics as first philosophy"⁶⁰ and "the primacy of the ethical" as "an irreducible structure upon which all the other structures rest."⁶¹ His ethics advances a radical openness of the Self to the Other and constitutes morality exclusively as the Self's responsibility for the Other. His concept of justice reintroduces the culture of being in the primordial ethical relation, but as the latter is held to be self-sufficient, justice is ultimately apperceived – in opposition to subjective totality – in terms of divine infinity. For us, it is also important to note that in Lévinas' view "the relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation," and, in a similar vein, "truth is produced only in veritable conversation," which for him is justice.⁶²

e) Jacques Derrida on Hospitality and (Auto)immunity

Also holding a positive view of cosmopolitanism, Derrida makes important contributions to the discussion of the "citizen of the world" and the "stranger," particularly in his discussions on hospitality and (auto)immunity. Mindful of historical developments, he pays special attention to the arguments of Kant and Lévinas.

In opposition to Kant's "universal hospitality," which for him was part of the idea of the "citizen of the world" and as such subject to a number of conditions, Derrida formulates the notion of "absolute or unconditional hospitality." In this he is strongly influenced by Lévinas.⁶³ Derrida holds that the stranger should be welcomed as friend, whether or not they come invited, whether or not they have the right papers – or, indeed, any at all – even when they come as an enemy with "worst of intentions."⁶⁴ While practically problematic and possibly unachievable due to a number of ethical, political, economic, legal factors, Derrida understands unconditional hospitality on the same terms as the Kantian sense of "Idea" as "infinitely removed, always inadequately approached, but inaccessible for the structural reasons" and eventually

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 157; cf. p. 24.

⁵⁹ Ibid., especially pp. 9-10, 81-82, 93, 100, 102, 125, 135, 144-145, 153, 164; cf. pp.23-24, 130-132, 149, 158-159, 161, 199, 212, 226-227, 239-240, 256.

⁶⁰ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 79; cf. *Totalité et infini*, p. 77

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 304; cf. p. 340.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 39, 70-71; cf. pp. 29, 66-67.

⁶³ Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, responses to an invitation by Anne Dufourmantelle, translated by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 25; cf. *De l'Hospitalité, Anne Dufourmantelle invite - Jacques Derrida à répondre* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1997), p. 29.

⁶⁴ Jacques Derrida, "Hospitality," *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000), p. 17n.

achievable.⁶⁵ To be sure, this was also the way Kant conceived of “universal hospitality” and the perpetual peace it was supposed to facilitate, but this is not the only aspect that props up the association of these two ideas. In fact, Derrida thinks these two views of hospitality are as much heterogenous as they are indissociable,⁶⁶ such that raising the former also raises the latter, as well as the connections between them.⁶⁷

Derrida elaborates on their connection in his discussion of the contradictory status of hospitality, which becomes conspicuous when its conditions prove dependent on relations of power. In this regard, he draws on Émile Benveniste,⁶⁸ who, analyzing the etymology of the Latin *hospes*, traces the attachment of its elements *hostis* (guest) and *potis* (master) to household power relations, thus also revealing its literal meaning as “guest-master.”⁶⁹ It is important at this point to bear in mind that *hostis* could mean “guest” as well as “enemy,”⁷⁰ which points to the contradictory character of hospitality, as also does the ambiguity of the French *hôte*, which could mean “host” or “guest.” “Hospitality, hostility, *hostpality*.”⁷¹ This is how Derrida reads and basically deconstructs the sense of hospitality. For him, this means that the tension between universal and unconditional hospitality, between the Kantian cosmopolitan stranger and the Lévinasian Other, will persist, as it is already coded in the semantics of the term. And yet, it also means that “we would need to venture into what is both the implication and the consequence of this double bind, this impossibility as condition of possibility, namely, the troubling analogy in their common origin between *hostis* as host and *hostis* as enemy, between hospitality and hostility.”⁷² For, like the “black swan,” a metaphor Derrida appends to Kantian pragmatism, rare as it is but still real and eventually seen, we could possibly achieve at some future point in time the ideal that looks so distant and improbable now.⁷³

Derrida’s sense of unconditional hospitality can be properly understood within the Lévinasian perspective of the ethical as an absolute demand that the Other (as guest) poses to the subject (as host), a demand which has by definition no limits and which the subject never ignores but always deliberately welcomes. In this way, Derrida’s “unconditional hospitality” is differentiated from the Kantian “universal hospitality,” though its materialization would inevitably run into obstacles of a practical, political, or legal nature that may render it impossible and thus far from precluding violence against the Other. Still, for Derrida, unconditional hospitality is the least violent treatment of the Other, compared to any imposed

⁶⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, pp. 147-149; cf. *De l’Hospitalité*, pp. 129-131.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147; cf. p. 131.

⁶⁷ Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality,” p. 3.

⁶⁸ Émile Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, translated by Elizabeth Palmer (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1973).

⁶⁹ Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality,” pp. 13-14.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15.

⁷¹ Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, p. 45; cf. p. 45.

⁷² Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality,” pp. 14-15.

⁷³ Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, translated by George Collins (London & New York: Verso Books, 1997), pp. 257-261; cf. *Politiques de l’amitié ; suivi de L’oreille de Heidegger* (Paris : Éditions Galilée, 1994), pp. 288-292).

conditionality or requirements, which implies the need for deconstruction to clear away such obstacles.

Derrida also connects his notion of hospitality with notions of immunity and auto-immunity, which we have discussed in greater detail elsewhere.^{74 75} We simply note here that immunity compasses precisely the letting-in of an enemy into what is one's own – one's body – for the sake of creating a defense system to ensure the enhancement of one's health. Auto-immunity, on the other hand, is the point at which one's own defense system attacks what it is supposed to protect: one's own body, one's own health. In this sense, Derrida's perspective on hospitality suggests a notion of globalization which allows strangers or enemies inside one's borders. Likewise, Derrida's perspective on the politics of friendship suggests that "citizenship of the world", that is, cosmopolitanism (letting the "stranger" or "enemy" in, or the unconditional welcoming of the Other as friend), is the healthy approach that properly ensures society's well-being for the future. Whereas its opposite, the closure of borders for the sake of self-protection, can now be seen as an auto-immune illness that is detrimental to the society as a whole.

f) Jean-François Lyotard on the Postmodern and Paganism

Among the contributors to the debate on the differentiation between modernity and postmodernity, we single out Jean-François Lyotard who has offered a perspective on the postmodern that also fittingly serves our delineation of the globie.⁷⁶ Lyotard's view of the postmodern draws upon his notion of paganism to which he devoted considerable attention in the 1970s.⁷⁷

Lyotard detects the modern in "any science that legitimates itself" in terms of a "metadiscourse", that is, a "grand narrative" from the type of the universalistic worldview we inherited from the Enlightenment, "such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth."⁷⁸ On the other hand, he understands the position of the "*postmodern* as incredulity toward metanarratives," an

⁷⁴ Rossen Roussev, "Feminism, Deconstruction, and Literary Criticism: A Deconstructive Feminist Reading of Nathaniel Hawthorne's Novel *The Scarlet Letter* with the Help of Alice Jardine and Jacques Derrida," *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 4 (2021), pp. 68-69.

⁷⁵ Other insightful discussions of the same concept in the context of literary criticism can be found in Yasemin Karaağaç, "Hostility, Hospitality, and Autoimmunity in Kadare's *The Fall of The Stone City*," *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 4 (2021), especially pp., 11-15, 20ff, <http://philogc.org/vol-4/>; as well as, Catherine MacMillan, "Looking for the Rogue: Democratic Autoimmunity in José Saramago's *Seeing*," *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 4 (2021), especially pp. 27ff, <http://philogc.org/vol-4/>.

⁷⁶ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1984)f; cf. *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979).

⁷⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, *Instructions païennes* (Paris: Editions Gaillee, 1977). Jean-François Lyotard, *Rudiments païens* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1977). Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, *Just Gaming*, translated by Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); cf. *Au juste* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1979).

⁷⁸ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, p. xxiii; cf. *La condition postmoderne*, p. 7.

incredulity that he connects with “the crisis of the metaphysical philosophy,”⁷⁹ which became conspicuous in the post-Enlightenment period. The postmodern, then, comes out of the ruins of the modern demand for legitimacy which, while apparently necessary, proved – with the loss of credibility of the metanarratives – to be quite illusory.

Lyotard thinks that the crisis of modernity is a result of the sciences loss of touch with originary narrative knowledge that needed no other legitimation than itself. As the scientific knowledge was “no longer principally narrative,” it could not “judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge,” nor could it be judged by it, due to the difference in criteria.⁸⁰ To legitimate its discourse, postmodern knowledge had to account for the heterogeneity of the narrative knowledges without resorting to universalistic criteria. It needed to “refine our sensitivity to differences and reinforce our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”⁸¹

Lyotard saw a way out of the crisis of legitimation as well as the possibility for accepting incommensurable differences in the “method” of Wittgenstein’s language games. In the manner of the latter Wittgenstein, who dismissed the possibility of a general characteristic that all games might have in common,⁸² Lyotard now acknowledges that science cannot legitimate its “own language game,” nor any “other language games,” for even if “the social bond” is rooted in language, it “is not woven with a single thread.”⁸³ Language games have their rules but the latter are not readily transferable to the former through the use of general rules⁸⁴ (a difficulty that Wittgenstein tried to resolve with his notion of “family resemblances”).⁸⁵ Instead, the rules of the games are a matter of “contract, explicit or not,” which define each game, and which qualify an “utterance” as a “move” in it, thereby also conditioning the manner of involvement of the players, which is not fixed but vary from “general agonistics” to “sheer pleasure” and “endless invention.”⁸⁶

In Lyotard’s view, language games are truly a “postmodern” approach to legitimation in an era when people are no longer nostalgic for a “lost narrative” but have realized that “legitimation” can be sought only in their socio-linguistic practices.⁸⁷ Thus, placing it in the realm of practical narrative invention (rather than that of metanarrative application), Lyotard regards the postmodern as “a part of the modern” with its claim to innovation, but not as something following upon the end of the modern; rather, it is something that precedes it as its “nascent state” and which is “constant.”⁸⁸ He reads in this semantically “paradoxical” relation between modern and postmodern as an attempt for “presetting the unrepresentable,” finding it in

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. xxiv; cf. pp. 7-8.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 26; cf. p. 47.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. xxv; cf. pp. 8-9.

⁸² Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations/ Philosophische Untersuchungen*, especially #65, #66.

⁸³ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 40; cf. *La condition postmoderne*, p. 66.

⁸⁴ On the rules of the language games, Lyotard is not a strict Wittgensteinian, which he has also acknowledged. Ibid., p. 88 (note 33); cf. p. 23 (note 33).

⁸⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations/ Philosophische Untersuchungen*, especially #66, #67, #71, #72.

⁸⁶ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 10; cf. *La condition postmoderne*, pp. 22-23.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 41; cf. p. 68.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

Nietzsche's nihilism and Kant's view of the sublime, as well as in much of the artistic and literary culture from Picasso and Braque, Proust and Joyce, to Malevitch and Duchamp amongst others.⁸⁹ In the end, Lyotard will specify the postmodern as that part of the modern that decisively brings "the unrepresentable in presentation" while keeping away from "the solace of good forms" and "the consensus of a taste," which reek of "the nostalgia for the unattainable" universals.⁹⁰

We shall now draw some attention to Lyotard's view of paganism, which adds further detail to his the sense of the postmodern. He links paganism to judgement "without criteria," which he sees as relevant to the matters of truth, beauty, justice, politics and ethics.⁹¹ This type of judgement and decision was pressing in the wreckage of the universalistic "grand narratives" of modernity, and we saw the reassignment in the recourse made to the method of language games used in our everyday narrative practices. With his notion of paganism, Lyotard takes another standpoint, in which the culture of polytheistic religions, based on narratives of multiple gods, is seen as inaugurating a society that is "constantly forced to redraw its code" and – lacking an acknowledged "metalanguage" – treat of its matters of importance "always in judgments of opinion and not in judgments of truth."⁹² In such a society, gods only "signify." They "do not speak" to people to ordain their culture. Rather, involved immediately in people's daily life, gods "just have their stories" as people do.⁹³

Thus, for Lyotard, paganism acknowledges that "each game is played as such" and that no game is "the game of all the other games," much less "the true one." In this schema, "pagans are artists" in that "they can move" between the games, come up with "new moves," and even "invent new games."⁹⁴ To explain the pagan judgment, Lyotard once again invokes Nietzsche and Kant, more specifically, the will to power and constitutive imagination, in which judgement is made without pre-given criteria but upon inventing criteria specific to the singularity of each situation.⁹⁵ In this way, a "multiplicity of justices" can be served without resorting to a universalistic criteria of judgment but by defining each "singular justice" in terms of the specific rules of each particular game (the claim itself, though, as Lyotard has conceded, is universalistic in character).⁹⁶

Lyotard's view of the postmodern and paganism offers a perspective that is appropriate to the individual situations of global cultural encounter. The singularity of each such situation demands from our globie to put on hold the metanarratives of their worldview and to approach it keeping in view to its specific conditions.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 77-81.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

⁹¹ Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, *Just Gaming*, p. 16.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 17, 28.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 60-61.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

We take the philosophical perspectives discussed to be relevant in their especial ways to the topic of cosmopolitanism and its essential concept of the “citizen of the world.” They are indeed marked most of all by their theoretical character, but as theory inevitably falls short of capturing the full richness of practice, to properly render the recurrent dynamics of the concept at stake, they would need to be modified in each of its particular (indeed, historical) instantiations. Here we propose the term “globie” as standing for a postmodern type of citizen of the world, whose thinking and adaptability would be pertinent to that dynamic determined by the socio-cultural and economic realities of the day. The “globie” however is described here as an open-ended phenomenon, rather than defined in strictly essentialist terms, which are here deemed a subject of a due deconstruction. A phenomenological discussion always aims at an essentialist determination of its subject-matter, but such a determination is also always a subject to a timely deconstruction demanded by the dynamics of existence and specific contexts. Thus, phenomenology and deconstruction are seen here as indispensable to postmodern thinking. They acknowledge the recurrent need of revisiting the relationship between universal and particular, which in our understanding also suggests the need for the repositioning of global and local significations, in each particular instance, as demanded by praxis.

The Globie as a Role-model and Carrier of a New Affirmative Culture

Potentially, we are all globies, and globies in the senses delineated above are becoming ever more common. It is anticipated that at some point in time they will constitute the majority of the inhabitants of this planet.

What is socio-culturally important and decisive is that globies are carriers of a new culture in two senses. First, they bring in their culture to mix with another culture. Second, as a consequence, they are harbingers of a *new global culture* that inevitably arises because of the interaction between people that are different culturally, and between the global and the local. What is particularly obvious to us is that *as carriers of global cultural encounters and as the moving force for the establishment of the new global culture, they portend a future that is increasingly inclusive and multicultural in character.*

Furthermore, globies do this the postmodern way: along their own singular presence and within the unique particularity of their new circumstance. Regardless of their own convictions and beliefs, globies contribute to and represent the new global culture that *de facto* embraces multi-culturalism as a norm. Historically, this point can be about as controversial as it gets, but our role model globie belongs to a culture of openness and tolerance, that is, a culture of curiosity, conversation, learning, contribution, sharing, and inclusion. However, the case has been all too often, globies are not always as “good” as our affirmative role model of the globie. (The exploitative colonizer and the fugitive of justice spring to mind as examples of “bad” globies.) But rather than passing judgment on good or bad globies, our purpose is to identify prevailing, general, positive, and affirmative cases of the globie that might function as a carrier of a new affirmative global culture.

While this new affirmative global culture cannot be defined in strict phenomenological terms and will remain theoretically and hermeneutically open-ended, as our sense of globie is, we still venture to identify conceptual features which our role-model globie is expected, though

not necessarily obliged, to emulate. We have already discussed the putative representatives and essential features of the globie, as well as its associations with migration and the notion of the citizen of the world. Now, by way of recapitulation, we will proceed to outline the worldview and value system that inaugurate the culture of which our role model globie is harbinger and carrier, keeping in mind that further elaborations in this regard will be always necessary utilizing relevant concepts from the philosophical tradition.

1) In our preliminary description of the globie, we differentiated “moving around the globe” from “moving around the neighborhood or metro area.” We drew attention to several of the globie’s putative representatives who move around the globe for professional, artistic, and other reasons, which are often found in combination. While they may be categorized more broadly as a type of migrant, unlike most migrants, theirs is a move motivated largely *by choice*, rather than by some external necessity, though a strict border between these factors cannot be drawn. For instance, while global professionals are strictly speaking economic migrants, they have much greater agency than the average economic migrant. Subsequently, we identified a *free spirit* as a character of globie ethos and referred to the art resident as a prime example. Likewise, globies who migrate due to their value system or worldview add another facet to our picture of the globie. Ideologically, globies may differ considerably, but they inevitably privilege compatibility and inclusion, though the latter may have limiting factors. Nevertheless, our view is that globies as carriers of global cultural encounters facilitate a new global culture which can accommodate a multiplicity of other cultures by constantly reinventing the relation between global and local.

2) Using the terms “home” and “journey,” we noted they largely coincide for the globie. Our use of these terms ranges from the everyday and popular to the metaphorical and philosophical. Unlike the traditional political or economic migrant, in leaving one region for another, a globie is not just searching for a new home in the narrow sense of the term. Rather, in being a migrant *by choice*, a globie is already *at home* in the world literally, as much as *at home* with the world in the metaphorical Heideggerian sense. We can therefore add that, in each instance, driven by the dynamics of existence, a globie is simply *returning* home. What amounts to the same thing is that, at home, the globie feels not-at-home, and not at home, globie feels at-home. In other words, *the globie is at(-)home in journey and journey is their (coveted) home*. Furthermore, it is important to note that the globie here is not just a commuter in the popular sense. While there may be an element of the commuter in the globie (their daily routines in each location), but a commuter does not essentially leave their place in the sense of leaving one culture to enter another. Indeed, a commuter defines the places they travel to as their own by the very fact of commuting. A globie would be a commuter only if we re-define commute phenomenologically as some kind of “existential commute” which – in Heideggerian terms – would be homecoming in *waying*, or homecoming as *waying*.

3) As the globie can settle in fairly distant parts of the globe, they are not just commuting, traveling, or sightseeing but migrating. Yet the globie is different from most other migrants in migrating *by choice*. The globie is a postmodern migrant in our sense of someone for whom

home and journey essentially coincide and who is thus always coming home. Still, we do not define a globie entirely by movement, not at least in its literal sense; someone is also a globie by thinking, which can take them around the globe in a metaphorical sense. It is through thought that we entertain significations both global and local, therefore we are all globies so long as we think. Therefore, Kant is a globie, even if he never left Königsberg. So are Zarathustra, Abraham, Buddha, Christ, Muhammad, even if they never travelled anywhere. These historic figures are globies because they think globally and spread their word locally; that is, because they disseminate a culture which is global in that it contains global and local significations.

4) We see the globie as the postmodern version of the “citizen of the world,” which has had considerable attention in the history of ideas. We drew attention to a handful of philosophical views that in one way or another contribute to our notion of the globie.

Diogenes of Sinope used the term to describe himself as someone who came from another city, became a philosopher, adapted to his new circumstances, was open to people without compromising his morals, valued freedom of speech and conversation as means of self-correction and education, valued simple ways and animal life. While his beliefs and values inaugurated the idea of the “citizen of the world,” they also inaugurated its culture, the culture of cosmopolitanism, even though its eventual adoption in the locality of practice will always need a critical appropriation. Diogenes himself fits well within our notion of globie in its more literal sense of a migrant and more metaphoric one of a thinker. He is thus a prime example and source of globie culture.

On his part Kant thought that, as the nation state with its laws puts an end to the state of nature of “war of all against all,” so too peace between nations can be maintained by international laws that would amount to a union between them or a form of “cosmopolitan state.” To him, this would result in an actualization of the “citizen of the world,” whose existence would be facilitated by human rights that constitute “universal hospitality” that he nonetheless subjected to considerable limitations. Kant argued that human reason naturally comes up with the idea of universal hospitality, just as it does universal moral law, both of which, he believed, help nation states realize that peace is more profitable than war thereby encouraging them to maintain peaceful trading relations. While Kant’s thinking most certainly qualifies him as a globie and he can, on the whole, be commended for his contribution to the culture of the globie, it has to be said that his idea of universal hospitality for the citizen of the world falls below today’s standards of human rights and freedom of movement.

Simmel offered a discussion of the “stranger” joining a local community largely defined by the nativity of its members and its geographic location. The stranger he had in mind is “no owner of soil” and taxed differently from the locals. Nevertheless, the stranger’s position in the community is seen positively because they accept what is regarded as their appropriate role (i.e. such as those of city judge and personal confidante. As “human relations” according to Simmel are conditioned by “spatial relations”, he apperceives the figure of the stranger as a “unity of nearness and remoteness” in the literal and metaphorical senses. In his view, the “unity of nearness and remoteness” characterizes all personal relations, which the stranger positively affirms by adding to the community a potential that had not been present before. We endorse Simmel’s account of globie culture, in particular, his emphasis on the stranger’s positive

involvement with the local community, as well as his acute perception of the strangeness in all human relations. It must be said though but that he limited the role he conceived for the stranger to the needs and circumstances of the receiving community.

The philosophy of Lévinas constitutes a postmodern critique of the Western philosophy, which he sees as a philosophy of Being and facilitating violence. To him, “metaphysics precedes ontology” and is enacted between the Self with the Other, which he characterizes as a fundamentally ethical relation. Hence, his position is that ethics must be the “first philosophy” demanding a reinvention of the traditional foundationalist role of the subject as a response to subjection by another, which amounts to a responsibility for another that is immediate and not a subject to rationally formulated moral law. While Lévinas regards the relationship between the Self and the Other as self-sufficient, he does concede that it is disturbed by a “third party,” which he associates with “justice,” the presence of society and the culture of Being “in the proximity of the other.” Still, as justice is apperceived through the presence of the Other, all culture is bound to the primordial ethical relation. Also, as the subject is no longer bound to the “order” of Being, justice now appears in the ethical relation as the extra-ordinary presence of “infinity” and its “prophecy.” We see Lévinasian ethics as a fitting element of the culture of the globie in its radical openness to the Other, which it welcomes unconditionally and without prejudice whilst remaining mindful of the presence of the socio-cultural norms of justice.

Derrida offers a further contribution to the “citizen of the world” through his concepts of “unconditional hospitality” and “(auto)immunity.” His view of hospitality is opposed to the Kantian “universal hospitality” and is strongly influenced by the ethics of Lévinas. Derrida sees the unconditional hospitality as being welcoming of the stranger regardless of invitation, documentation, or intention. While “unconditional hospitality” seems unrealistic, he understands it to be indissociable from “universal hospitality” which we should endeavor to achieve gradually over time like the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace.” He explains the indissociability of these two senses of hospitality in through the Latin “*hospes*,” whose root “*hostis*” in holding the two contradictory meanings of “guest” and “enemy” engenders both the sense of hospitality and hostility. Taking into account the origin of “*hospes*” in the power relations of the household, Derrida also suggests that hospitality is dependent on the way these relations are construed. Derrida’s discussion of “immunity” and “autoimmunity” can help us attain the positive sense of his notion of unconditional hospitality. Immunity is developed by letting the enemy inside for the sake of one’s own bodily health; whereas in autoimmunity one’s defense mechanism becomes detrimental to health by attacking one’s own body. Derrida associated immunity with a border that is open to strangers, and the closing of this border with the unhealthy over-protection of autoimmunity. We see Derrida’s perspective on hospitality as a healthy conceptual element for the culture of the globie.

Lyotard has offered a perspective on the ‘postmodern’ as part of the attempt in the last century to come to terms philosophically with culture of modernity. In his view, modernity is the age of “science’s metanarrative legitimation,” as opposed to postmodernity in which these metanarratives have lost credibility. Credibility, however, is still an issue for postmodernity which needs to legitimize its discourse without relying on metanarratives. Lyotard sees the potential for legitimation in the “method” of Wittgenstein’s “language games,” which apperceives the meaningful use of language within the specific situations in which it is invoked.

For Lyotard, a language game is defined by rules which qualify each “utterance” as a “move” within it and thus confers meaning and significance. Complementary to this approach is his idea of “paganism” which, for him, is a way of passing judgement without relying on pre-established criteria and in the spirit of Nietzsche’s “will to power” and Kant’s “constitutive imagination.” Lyotard sees many similar cultural attempts over the last two centuries to “present the unrepresentable,” which for him marks the postmodern. As such, the Postmodern cannot be strictly separated from the Modern (and its claim to the new). It is not only part of the Modern, but also according to Lyotard and indeed as its “nascent state.” We see in Lyotard’s postmodernism another component that fits conceptually within the culture of the globie: a perspective that prepares the globie as a critical thinker for the uniqueness of global cultural encounters.

Conclusion

We attempted to describe a distinct postmodern phenomenon of world migration, citizenship, and culture in designating the globie. Our delineation is certainly partial and in our view remains open-ended and ready for future elaboration. We focused on the features of what we considered to be a role model: someone who moves around the globe literally and metaphorically, who is the front-runner of global cultural encounters, and who is carrier of a new affirmative global culture. The globie thinks globally and exists locally (as well as the other way around). The globie wants to explore new horizons and also wants to share them. For the globie values conversation as means, dwelling, and manner of encounter. To remain open-ended, globie culture cannot be missionary in a dogmatic sense but only inclusive. Indeed, if the globie were to have a mission, it would have to be to eliminate dogma, spread open-mindedness, and advance exchange, inclusion, peace, prosperity, and conversation. The globie is a carrier of a culture that is shaped by global cultural encounters, a new global culture that develops by including other cultures.

The globie is progressive, more often than not. The globie can be open to novelty, but open-mindedness does not mean an uncritical acceptance of new discoveries. Instead, our affirmative role-model globie is a critical, phenomenological, deconstructive, and creative thinker: they do not take their previous socio-cultural beliefs for granted, nor do they think of such beliefs as unshakable merely by virtue of a certain “justification.” The globie is smart enough to realize their arbitrariness and cultural conditioning. But the globie is not simply a relativist who crosses over the heterogeneity of the world in a reductionist fashion, for relativism is an old-style metaphysical perspective which the globie is not nostalgic for. Yes, mindful of the misunderstanding and injustice that may ensue from the application of universals, the globie is ready to drop all metanarratives for the virtues of Wittgenstein’s language games, but also to retain in each instance a judgement that benefits from Aristotelian wonder and the sense of adventure availed by a journey. The globie searches then for pointers of justice in situ – in the manner of the Nietzschean will and Kantian aesthetic subject, whose globalist virtue consists in their criteriological openness – in order to make a new, unique, and fair judgment.

The globie is a Diogenean, Kantian, and Derridian citizen of the world that is always a concrete exemplification of a positively contributive Simmelian stranger, ethical Lévinasian subject, and postmodern Lyotardian inventor. The globie is a Diogenean cosmopolite backing

freedom of speech and conversation as means for critique and education, who lives in accordance with their beliefs and who values nature and animal life. The globie is a Kantian citizen of the world who is subject to a universal hospitality and its limitations but still offers their fair share of contribution to the perpetual peace and prosperity of the union of nations, regardless of how distant the actual prospects for peace and prosperity. The globie is a Simmelian stranger who enters a community to contribute to it in their own way utilizing their objectivity, confidentiality, and profession. The globie is ethical in the postmodern Lévinasian way having a heart and compassion for the Other, their neighbor, the needy, while staying mindful of the order of justice within the world as far exceeding the limited capacity of their subjectivity. The globie is open to Derridean unconditional hospitality keeping in mind the reality of the obstacles it can face but hoping that it can gradually materialize as they venture into the contradictory relations of power that inaugurate it. The globie is a postmodern inventor and pagan in Lyotardian sense in focusing on particulars and willing to do them justice in their respective language games, while staying mindful of the misunderstandings that can ensue due to grand narratives. The globie is also a Rortyan pragmatic dreamer believing in democracy and social justice, dreaming of a world “without human suffering and oppression,” and gives their due to “the greatest happiness to the greatest number.”

The globie, it must be said, may not necessarily be aware of or even agree with the characteristics that we ascribe to them here, but in their contribution to the formation of the new affirmative global culture it suffices that the globie emulates them. Our affirmative case of the role-model globie excludes deplorable traits, because otherwise it would not be for us a viable phenomenon. Of course, in reality we cannot exclude the possibility that a particular individual may not be a good person. But in our affirmative case, the globie is moved by the desire to contribute, share, and include. The globie is thus meant to be as distant from the image of the colonizer-exploiter as possible, and instead much closer to a Mother Theresa who might be our ideal globie.