

## THINKING AND PHILOSOPHIZING AS THE JOURNEY OF WAYING AND HOMECOMING: HEIDEGGER, LAO-TSE, AND HERODOTUS

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*Wie weit der Mensch in seinem  
eigenem Wesen uneinheimisch ist,  
verrät die Meinung, die er von sich  
hegt als demjenigen, der Sprache  
und Verstehen, Bauen und Dichten  
erfunden habe und erfunden habe  
könnte.*

The extent to which humanity is not at home in its own essence is betrayed by the opinion human beings cherish of themselves as those who have invented and who could have invented language and understanding, building and poetry.

Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*

### **Abstract**

*Heidegger's metaphors of 'way' (Weg) and 'home' (Heim, House) offers a perspective for understanding both the epistemic and existential aspects of all thinking and philosophizing. His senses of 'way' (Weg), 'waying' (wägen, Bewegung), and 'woodpaths' (Holzwege) point to the epistemic character of thinking, whereas the ones of the 'uncanny' (Unheimlichkeit), 'homelessness' (Heimatlosigkeit), and 'homecoming' (Heimkehr) – to its existential motivation. Way as pathway and method, waying as clearing and way-making, and woodpaths as ways with no proper beginning and end link thinking and philosophizing to a phenomenology of movement, or a peculiar type of epistemic journey. For its part, the uncanny state of Dasein in 'anxiety' (Angst), later seen as the essential homelessness of the historical man, conditions thinking and philosophizing existentially along a "conquest*

of the earth” and the “cosmic space,” which would secure – upon a long waying – its anticipated homecoming.

Remarkably, a similar sense of waying and homecoming can be isolated in the key concepts of Lao-tse’s *Tao-Te Ching*. Most generally, for Lao-tse, *Tao* is the ‘way’ of all existence and *Te* stands for one’s individual adherence to that way. While *Tao* remains “beyond the power of words” and is thus ‘wu’ or nothing, it nonetheless designates the harmony and balance of all there is -- all beings. It is thus also the way of *Te*, of one’s mind and body, thinking and living, which dispels all strife and tension to ensure one’s harmonious and peaceful co-existence with the rest of the world. In this sense, *Te* can be seen as one’s ‘way’ to and one’s ‘home’ in the harmony of *Tao*, whereas to the extent that *Te* becomes pressing in a possible loss of *Tao*, an actualized *Te* as a search for *Tao* is also one’s ‘waying’ and ‘homecoming’.

That thinking and philosophizing can be aptly apperceived within the metaphors of waying and homecoming, can be also attested by the first record of a conjoined usage of ‘*philos*’ and ‘*sophia*’, which is found in Herodotus’ *Histories*. Herodotus uses the verb ‘*philosopheîn*’ broadly in the sense of love to learn (a conjecture of both existential and epistemic meanings) and links it to traveling around the world “for the sake of seeing” it. Thus, in this primordial usage, philosophy can be seen as a ‘journey’, which within our terms here can be seen also as including ‘waying’ and ‘homecoming’.

In this paper, I explore the metaphors of way (*Weg, Tao*), home (*Heim, House*), and journey (*theōriā*) to show its aptness for apperceiving our reflective activities of thinking and philosophizing. I draw mainly on the works of Martin Heidegger, Lao-tse, and Herodotus aiming at a perspective of understanding that captures both the epistemic and existential aspects of these activities. Heidegger has used metaphors of ‘way’ and ‘home’ extensively in his both early and later works – arguably in such way that the former can be seen as conveying the epistemic character of thinking and philosophizing while the latter their existential motivation. Additionally, the multifaceted senses of the key concepts of Lao-tse’s classic *Tao Te Ching* can be fittingly appropriated along the same lines of thought as well.<sup>1</sup> And whereas a further support on behalf of the metaphors in question can be sought also elsewhere, perhaps the most suggestive one can be found in the context of the first recorded conjoined usage of *philos* and *sophia* known from Herodotus’ *Histories*, where philosophy is associated with ‘journey’. Thus, my exposition will need to go through several steps: I shall first discuss Heidegger’s metaphors of ‘way’ and ‘home’ in relation to thinking and philosophizing in his both early and latter works; next, I discuss key aspects of Lao-tse’s concepts of *Tao* and *Te*, which can be closely paralleled with

<sup>1</sup> Here, I shall refer to the author of the classic as Lao-tse and to its title as *Tao Te Ching*, or shall simply use *Laozi* (as it has become already a practice in light of the controversies surrounding its authorship and transliteration in Latin). But when quoting specific editions in English, I shall use their respectively adopted transliterations for both authorship and title. The same applies also for the usage of the terms *Tao* and *Te*. When repeatedly referring to a particular translation, I shall use only the name(s) of the translator(s).

Heidegger's metaphors of 'way' and 'home'; then, I discuss the metaphors of 'journey' in relation to philosophizing in Herodotus' *Histories*; and finally, by way of conclusion, I discuss the overall apperception of thinking and philosophizing within the metaphors of 'way', 'home', and 'journey' within the perspective of the present investigation.

### **1. Heidegger's early metaphors of 'way'**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses *way* (*Weg*) and other movement (*Bewegung*, *bewegen*) related metaphors to point to the dynamic and non-fixed character of *Dasein* as existential subject. Unlike the apparently uniform (and in this sense unchanging or static) character of the knowing 'subject-consciousness', which dominated the philosophical tradition prior to him, Heidegger's *Dasein* is conceived of as inextricable from its existence and as intricately within the world of change. Heidegger has thus characterized it phenomenologically as "Being-in-the-world" (*In-der-Welt-sein*),<sup>2</sup> which in essence also meant that its existential dynamics could no longer be ignored – neither in its epistemic aspirations, nor in its other cultural achievements. In this sense, the unfixed character of *Dasein* can be seen as its undeniable and intrinsic characteristic, whereas its existential analytic, which Heidegger undertook in its *magnus opus* as the initial task of any fundamental ontology, can be equally seen as an account of its dynamics.

As I see it, the unfixed character of Heidegger's *Dasein* as existential subject can be legitimately sought throughout all its workings, but as far as its epistemic endeavors are concerned it becomes particularly evident along his metaphors of 'way', which pervades *Being and Time* through and through. Here, I shall attempt a certain dissection of this metaphors focusing on elements of Heidegger's vocabulary, which point – often quite literally – to an irrevocable kinetic dimension of *Dasein*'s 'Being-in-the-world'. In my view, this will help elucidate the role of the metaphors of 'way' in *Dasein*'s epistemic aspirations, as well as in *Dasein*'s thinking as a whole. One note of approach might be helpful for understanding the outcome of my task here: I resort to using the expression 'Heidegger's metaphors', (even though he often uses 'way-', 'movement-', and 'home-' related words in their usual, literal, or non-metaphoric senses in the German language), both because it is suggestive of the broader phenomenological context of his investigation, in which the phenomena of existence – as philosophical phenomena – cannot be rendered in literal terms, and because Heidegger himself often plays on etymological and rare senses of the terms he uses to convey his own meanings together with the open-endedness of these phenomena. With this in mind, my investigation will aim at dissecting his vocabulary in a particular way – along his metaphors of 'way' and movement – while asserting the compatibility of its findings with his overall ontological perspective.

The three basic terms of Heidegger's metaphors of 'way' are *Weg*, *bewegen*, and *Bewegung*. In *Being and Time*, their usage varies from literal to more abstract and metaphoric. Thus, in the translations of John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson and Joan Stambaugh,<sup>3</sup> the

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 78ff; *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1993), SS 52ff.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). When specifying the sense of Heidegger's German terms in English below, I will take their meanings cumulatively as rendered in both of these translations. When pointing them in German, I will keep their respective conjugations in the original text, if they have not been used in their main form.

German noun *Weg* has been rendered as ‘way’, ‘method’, ‘path’, ‘avenue’, ‘road’, ‘procedure’, ‘pathway’, ‘route’, ‘by’, ‘means’. Similarly, the verb *bewegen* is rendered as ‘move’, ‘operate’, ‘based’, ‘take place’, ‘engage’, ‘move along’, ‘be in motion’, ‘motivate’; whereas the noun *Bewegung* is rendered ‘motion’, ‘movement’, ‘activity’. These usages may not surprise any modern day language speaker, but they are indicative of the key role of the metaphoric of ‘way’ for rendering the workings of Dasein.

One very indicative example of this role in Heidegger’s vocabulary is the noun *Bewegtheit*, which is rendered in the above mentioned translations as ‘movement’ and ‘being moved’. Heidegger uses it specifically to describe the “falling” of Dasein as “the movement of falling” (*die Bewegtheit des Verfallens*), which is a “‘movement’ of Dasein in its own Being,” or of Dasein’s “plunging out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness.”<sup>4</sup> *Bewegtheit* in this usage is indicative of Dasein’s inner state, which may not immediately have any perceptible expressions.

Another indicative example of Heidegger’s metaphors of ‘way’ is the adverb *vorweg*, translated as ‘ahead’, ‘in advance’, ‘beforehand’, ‘ahead of’. A compound of *vor* (‘before’) and *Weg* (‘way’), Heidegger uses it in his discussion of Dasein as ‘care’ (*Sorge*), which is preliminary to his discussion of *temporality*, where it is taken to signify ‘ahead’ in the construction ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’ (*Sich-vorweg-sein*).<sup>5</sup> For Heidegger, “Being-in-the-world is essentially care,” whereas, as ‘care’, “in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself.”<sup>6</sup> Here, ‘ahead’ signifies metaphorically, for it points once again to Dasein’s inner world or experience. The metaphoricity of ‘ahead’ becomes more obvious in Heidegger’s discussion of time, which takes up the non-stationary and unfixed character of Dasein as existence on a more fundamental ontological level. In his view, “temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein’s Being,” and “care must use ‘time’ ... must reckon with ‘time’.”<sup>7</sup> Dasein is subsequently characterized as *ecstatical*, which in its literal etymological sense means being “outside-of-itself,”<sup>8</sup> whereas *temporality* is seen as “the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.”<sup>9</sup> Dasein is ecstatical or ‘outside-of-itself’ in ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’, that is, as being oriented toward the future. Thus, it is in no other way but as Being-ahead-of-itself that Dasein encounters itself as temporality – it begins temporalizing by projecting itself as future. Whereas, as *temporality* ultimately remains “the primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s existentiality,”<sup>10</sup> (and thus for all Dasein’s epistemic attainments), *vorweg*, which – along with the core of Heidegger’s vocabulary of *time* – alludes to ‘movement’ and ‘space’, can be seen as a key metaphor for thinking and philosophizing.

In my view, Heidegger’s usage of ‘way’ related vocabulary in epistemic sense is most significant for understanding Dasein’s capacity of reflection. More particularly, *Wegräumen* has been used in the sense of ‘clearing away’ in relation to Dasein’s disclosure of ‘its own authentic Being’ and the ‘world’,

<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), p. 223; *Sein und Zeit*, S 178.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 235 ff.; SS 191ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237; SS 191-193.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278; S 235.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 370ff; SS 323ff.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 377; S 329.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277; S 234.

If Dasein discovers the world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery [Entdecken] of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way.<sup>11</sup>

If knowledge here is to be associated with the ‘disclosure’ (*Erschließen*) and ‘discovery’ (*Entdecken*) of Dasein and the ‘world’, it is achieved via ‘a clearing-away [*Wegräumen*] of concealments and obscurities’ and of the ‘disguises (*Verstellungen*) with which Dasein bars its own way.’ That *Wegräumen* has been also used in a more literal sense as “moving [equipment (*Zeug*)] out of the way,”<sup>12</sup> only makes its aptness as metaphor for thinking and philosophizing more convincing, as it points to the wide range of its phenomenologically disclosive usage. It is also very significant that this second usage has been associated with “Dasein’s making room (*Einräumung*) for itself” and “the self-directive discovery of something like a *region* (*Gegend*),” which point to a certain “wither” (*Wohin*), that is, to a locus from where and space where its handlings of equipment and workings as a whole unfold.<sup>13</sup> It aligns once again the classic phenomenological metaphors of ‘knowing as seeing’ with that of ‘waying as thinking’, and can be exemplified with Heidegger’s usages of verbs such as *wegzudeuten* (a compound verb that can be literally transcribed as ‘way-to-point-to/expound/interpret’) and *wegzuerklären* (literally transcribable as ‘way-to-clarify/elucidate/explain’) in the sense of ‘explain away’.<sup>14</sup>

Some adverbs also fit handily in Heidegger’s metaphors of ‘way’, even if in his usage they do not significantly deviate from their common meanings in the German language. Thus, *weg* (translated as ‘beyond’, ‘remote’, ‘out of the way’, ‘away from’, ‘far’, ‘distant’, ‘flight from’ or simply ‘away’), *keineswegs*, (‘by no means’, ‘not at all’, ‘certainly not’, ‘on no account’, ‘no’, ‘nothing’), *deswegen* (‘therefore’), and *unterwegs* (‘on its way’, ‘along our way’), add to a strong metaphoric association between ‘way’ and ‘thinking’, even if they could not attain terminological status. Thanks to the ‘way’ pointers in their etymology, their supporting adverbial role becomes more apparent and suggestive, the more conspicuous that association becomes in Heidegger’s core terminology.

The same is also true of much of his other ‘way’ vocabulary, including nouns, adjectives, and verbs, which while not necessarily having terminological status play a meaningful supporting role within the overall context of his early philosophical perspective. Here we count *Wegschiebenwollen* (‘pushing away’), *wegzuschieben* (‘to shove aside’, ‘to put aside’), *vorwiegend* (‘shoving itself ahead’, ‘moves ahead along’), *Vorweg-bereden* (‘talking about things ahead of’), *Ausweg* (‘way out’), *Umweg* (‘detour’), *Bewegungsverhältnis* (‘relation of movements’), *Vorwegnahme* (‘anticipation’, ‘foreseeing’), *Vorwegnehmens* (translated as ‘in advance’), *weggenommen* (‘taken away’, ‘removed’), *vorweggenommen* (‘taken for granted’, ‘anticipated’), *Wegsehen* (‘look away’, ‘look for the next’, ‘looking-away’), *wegbringen* (‘eliminate’, ‘remove’), *Weglegen* (‘laying aside’, ‘putting away’), *Bewegungsart* (‘downward plunge’), *Bewegtheitscharakter* (‘character of movement’), *Bewegungsbegriff* (‘kind of

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 167; S 129.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 420; S 368.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 420; S 368.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 320; S 275.

motion', 'concept of motion'), *abwegige* ('off the course', 'off course', 'off the track', 'farfetched'), *wegbewegt* ('moves away'), *Abwege* ('sidetracked', 'wrong turnings'), *Wegrichtung* ('direction'), *wegschleicht* ('slink away', 'slip away'), *hinwegzusetzen* ('disregard', 'elevate itself over'), *Wegweiser* ('signposts', 'guideposts'), *wegbereitend* ('furthering', 'in a preparatory way'), *Bewegungszusammenhang* ('connectedness of motions', 'connectedness of movements'), *Revolutionsbewegung* ('revolutionary period').

To conclude my discussion on the aptness of early Heidegger's metaphors of 'way' for apperceiving thinking and philosophizing, I shall draw attention to the penultimate paragraph of *Being and Time*,<sup>15</sup> where he offers a certain sum-up of his entire investigation, which I find to be keenly supportive of the goal of the present investigation,

One can never carry on researches into the source and the possibility of the 'idea' of Being in general simply by means of the 'abstractions' of formal logic – that is, without any secure horizon for question and answer. One must seek a *way* of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology, and this is the way one must *go*. Whether this is the *only* way or even the right one at all, can be decided only *after one has gone along it*. The conflict as to the Interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, *because it has not yet been enkindled*. And in the end this is not the kind of conflict one can 'bluster into'; it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it. Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is *on the way*.<sup>16</sup>

Heidegger's point here is clear: despite the helplessness of the 'formal logic' and the lack of 'any secure horizon for question and answer', 'one must seek a *way* (*Weg*) of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology'. One's proper apperception of that 'way' can become feasible 'only *after one has gone along it*', which essentially means that 'going along the way' is indispensable in this task. Furthermore, the necessity of the question of Being 'cannot be allayed' just because it has not been previously initiated – this question is so fundamental that a certain understanding of Being is always already presupposed in any discussion. But neither can this kind of necessity be addressed without 'preparations' – they are necessary not only because the question has not been previously isolated, but also because its character is such that one cannot give an ultimate answer to it. In this sense, Heidegger's investigation on the question of Being remains a 'preparation' for its elucidation, which otherwise put means that it can only be '*on the way*' (*unterwegs*).

The above quoted passage also neatly sums up our findings here so far. Our purpose in this section was to explore the role of the metaphors of 'way' in Heidegger's early thought and its relation to our reflective activities of thinking and philosophizing. We saw that the alignment of this metaphors with these activities is not just an arbitrary juxtaposition. In fact, the vocabulary related to 'way' pervades Heidegger's discussion of Dasein and its epistemic workings through and through. As a matter of course, its role can be seen in that – in the lack of 'any secure horizon for question and answer' – it functions as an identifiable carrier of the epistemic fundamentals of the existential analytic of Dasein. Along this metaphors of 'way', Dasein is

<sup>15</sup> I was prompted to this passage, as well as to work on the present paper, by Joan Stambaugh's insightful discussion of the metaphors of 'way' in her "Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics," in Graham Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 79-91.

<sup>16</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), pp. 487-488.; *Sein und Zeit*, S 437.

seen as being constantly “underway” with “standing and remaining being only limit cases of this directional ‘underway’”;<sup>17</sup> whereas its epistemic and ontological concerns remain inextricably bound with its peculiar existential dynamics. Finally, the above quoted passage also indicates that Heidegger thinks of ‘way’ not in the sense of a single, multiply applicable method of knowledge, but rather in the sense of an epistemic journey which may or may not bring the desired outcomes. It is in this latter sense, which is indeed essentially phenomenological, that thinking and philosophizing are tied to the unicity of *a way* and can be most readily apperceived as being *on the way* or as *waying*.

## 2. Heidegger’s latter metaphors of ‘way’

In his later works, Heidegger’s concept of ‘way’ becomes more nuanced, even though clear pointers to his view from *Being and Time* are unmistakably there. A thorough and extensive study of its metaphors is desirable and well-worth the effort, but it will remain beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For our purpose here, it will suffice to draw attention to some of the insightful findings of Joan Stambaugh, who has offered a neat discussion on it in her previously mentioned article, bringing together Heidegger’s changing perspectives on the ‘way’ and Lao-tse’s notion of *Tao* to bear on the question of metaphysics.

One of the first instances in Heidegger’s later metaphors of ‘way’ Stambaugh draws a special attention to is the brief untitled foreword of his *Holzwege (Woodpaths)*,

“Wood” is an old name for forest. In the wood are paths that mostly wind along until they end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket.

They are called “woodpaths.”

Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest. Often it seems as though one were identical to another. Yet it only seems so. Woodcutters and forest are familiar with these paths. They know what it means to be on a woodpath.<sup>18</sup>

What comes to focus here is the peculiar positioning of the ‘woodpaths’ in forests – they do not lead to an anticipated end but ‘end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket’. For Stambaugh, Heidegger appropriates philosophically the ‘woodpaths’ as a metaphor that is indicative of his own understanding of thinking. As she puts it, “the woodpaths express the fact that thinking is thoroughly and essentially questioning, a questioning not to be settled or ‘solved’ by any answer, a questioning that cannot calculate in advance the direction in which it will be led, let alone the destination in which it will arrive.”<sup>19</sup> We can note here that for the latter Heidegger ‘thinking as questioning’ is already a step aside from his assertion in the last quoted passage from *Being and Time* that one’s proper apperception of a ‘way’ can become feasible ‘only after one has gone along it’, even though in both cases he appears to maintain that for thinking ‘going along the way’ is indispensable. The difference is that ‘going along the way’ in

<sup>17</sup> Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” p. 79.

<sup>18</sup> David F. Krell (ed.), *Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 34; Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1950). For an alternative translation see Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>19</sup> Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” p. 80.

his early thought anticipates a more determined end – one that is signaled by the ‘fundamental question of ontology’. Whereas along the metaphor of the ‘woodpaths’ such an end is less determined – they are known to lead only to an abrupt end, or in a sense – to nowhere. Thus, thinking is here seen as an explorative ‘going along woodpaths’, which is accompanied by a clear sense of their limited routes. Indeed, as D. F. Krell and Stambaugh have noted, this determination of thinking is very much in contrast with the negative sense of the popular German expression to which Heidegger alludes in the last sentence of this untitled forward, which is “to be on the wrong track or in a *cul-de-sac*.”<sup>20</sup> But it captures the different sense for which his later thought appropriates the metaphors of ‘way’ – the sense of a *journey* into the unknown.

Stambaugh also draws attention to something we already noted above as it had already become clear by the end of *Being and Time*, namely, that Heidegger’s sense of ‘way’ “has essentially nothing to do with scientific and technological method,” because of his “polemic against *Vorhandenheit* (presence-at hand)” as “objective presence.”<sup>21</sup> Indeed, Heidegger’s ‘way’ is of a different kind – evading any objective presence-at-hand, it is somewhat paradoxically at once one that is particular and belonging to a ‘region’ (*Gegend*), as much as also one that is constantly in the making. It is linked to the metaphor of the ‘woodpath’ but also with ‘going along it’.

In this sense, ‘thinking as questioning’ is associated with going along a ‘woodpath’ as a way with an unknown end. Thinking is thus not confined to a well-established, pre-existent, objective (even if unknown) way; it is associated with the very *movement* along the way, a movement that inaugurates both ‘thinking’ and ‘way’ at once, a movement that ultimately renders *thinking as way*, as much as the way as *thinking*, *way of thinking*, or *way-thinking* (*Denk-Weg*). In a passage from *What is Called Thinking?* (to which Stambaugh also refers), Heidegger puts it like this,

Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only in remaining underway. To be on the way in order to clear the way...

In order to get underway, we do have to set out. This is meant in a double sense: for one thing, we have to open ourselves to the emerging prospect and direction of the way itself; and then, we must get on the way, that is, must take the steps by which alone the way becomes a way.

The way of thinking [Denk-Weg] cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere like a well-worn rut, nor does it at all exist as such in any place. Only when we walk it, and in no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questioning, are we on the move on the way [ist die Bewegung]. This movement is what allows the way to come forward. That the way of thought [Denkweges] is of this nature is part of the precursoriness of thinking...<sup>22</sup>

Thus, for the later Heidegger, thinking as ‘move on the way’ is essentially creating the ‘way’, whereas in *Being and Time* the ‘way’ is very much presupposed and just needed ‘a

<sup>20</sup> David F. Krell (ed.), *Basic Writings*, p. 34; Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” p. 81.

<sup>22</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, translated by Fred D. Wieck & Jesse Glenn Gray (New York, Evanston, London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 168-169; Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?*, *Gesamtausgabe I, Band 8* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2002), SS 173-174. German-text interpolations here are added.



clearing-away [*Wegräumen*] of concealments and obscurities' and of all the 'disguises (*Verstellungen*)' which barred Dasein's 'disclosure' of the world. This difference becomes more apparent when in his later thought he apperceives the kind of 'clearing' that is needed to sustain the 'way of thinking' along the metaphors of *wägen* and *Bewegung* of old the Alemannic Swabian dialect, which Stambaugh has called "Heidegger's utmost effort to make an initially somewhat indeterminate thought, the way, as concrete as possible."<sup>23</sup> As he puts it,

To clear a way... across a snow-covered field, is in the Alemannic-Swabian dialect still called *wägen* even today. This verb, used transitively, means: to form a way and, forming it, to keep it ready. Way-making [*Be-wägen* (*Be-wägung*)] understood in this sense no longer means to move something up or down a path [*Weg*] that is already there. It means to bring the way... forth first of all, and thus to *be* the way.<sup>24</sup>

If the verb *wägen* here means 'to clear a way... across a snow-covered field', the derivative *Bewegung* in this sense means 'way-making' or 'to bring the way... forth first of all, and thus to *be* the way', and is clearly related to 'movement'.<sup>25</sup> Thus, thinking and reflection can be seen as "entering into the movement of waying."<sup>26</sup> Or, otherwise put, for the later Heidegger, 'thinking' can be understood metaphorically as 'waying', as it is inseparable from the movement of clearing, forming, and keeping of the 'way'.

Another characteristic aspect of Heidegger's later metaphors of the way pointed by Stambaugh is the relation between "call" (*heissen*) and "way," which he also discusses in *What is Called Thinking*. There Heidegger writes that "in the widest sense, 'to call' means to set into motion, to get something underway ... in a gentle and unobtrusive manner," pointing that, traced to Sanskrit, the Greek word with the same meaning *keleuein* "means not so much a command as a letting-reach,... [and] has the assonance of helpfulness and complaisance," as in "to invite."<sup>27</sup> Thus, for Heidegger, 'thinking' and 'waying' are bound as much together as with the non-demanding character of 'what calls for thinking'. This non-demanding and yet inviting element of thought can be readily associated with the *truth of Being*, whose essence was understood as *freedom* or "letting beings be the beings that they are."<sup>28</sup> It is also in line with Heidegger's view from *Being and Time* that the openness of the truth of Being becomes accessible via Dasein's "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*) ensuing from a Lutheran "call of conscience."<sup>29</sup> Thus, whereas 'what calls for thinking', 'the truth of Being', 'thinking', and 'waying' appear to come together in Heidegger's thought through and through, it is his later

<sup>23</sup> Joan Stambaugh, "Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics," p. 83.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, translated by Peter D. Herz (New York, London, et al.: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982) pp. 129-130; Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe I, Band 12* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1985), S 249. German-text interpolations added.

<sup>25</sup> Joan Stambaugh, "Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics," p. 83.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 117; Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?*, *Gesamtausgabe I, Band 8*, SS 120-121.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in David F. Krell (ed.), *Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition, pp. 115-138; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe I, Band 9* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1976), SS 177-202.

<sup>29</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), pp. 341ff.; *Sein und Zeit*, SS 295ff.

metaphorics of the way that makes the difference from his early thinking and that ultimately renders *thinking* as *waying* in this explorative, open-ended, and in no way predetermined sense, which we associated above with *journey*.

I shall draw attention to two more points that Heidegger makes, which shed additional light on his later metaphorics of movement and waying. The first one is in his essay on Trakl in *On the Way to Language*, where he dwells on the original meaning of the word for sensing, which in German, as in Latin, is also part of the etymology of the words for meaning (*Sinn*) and reflection (*sinnen*). In a sentence, which Stambaugh focuses on, Heidegger points out that the old word “‘*Sinnan*’ originally meant to travel, to strive after, ... to take a certain direction,” and that its “Indo-German root *sent* and *set* means ‘way’.”<sup>30</sup> Thus, sensing, thinking, and traveling are shown to have a common semantic genealogy that is traceable to the Proto-Indo-European meaning of ‘way’. For us this means that in the context of the present inquiry ‘waying’ has been shown to be a fitting metaphor for ‘thinking’ once again.

Stambaugh takes Heidegger’s discussion of *Sinnan* to be a prelude to her discussion of his notion of *Gelassenheit* or releasement, (whose root *lassen*, meaning ‘letting’, already points to the non-demanding character of thinking as waying, which we linked to *the truth of Being* and his earlier notion of *Entschlossenheit* or resoluteness), but she also takes it as a pointer to the sense of Lao-tse’s unsayable *Tao*.<sup>31</sup> Heidegger himself has briefly discussed *Tao* in *On the Way to Language*, and his insights there will make also that last point I would like to bring here on behalf of the aptness of his metaphorics of ‘way’ for understanding thinking. The discussion in question is particularly germane to my endeavor here – first, because it throws light on both Heidegger’s understanding of thinking as waying and its relation to the key notion of the *Tao-Te Ching* classic; and second, because it very much sums up his view by bringing together the bulk of the findings of my inquiry so far. In Herz’s translation, it appears as the following two paragraphs,

The word ‘way’ probably is a primal word that speaks to the reflective mind of man. The key word in Laotse’s poetic thinking is *Tao*, which ‘properly speaking’ means way. But because we are prone to think of way’ superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our word ‘way’ has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what *Tao* says. *Tao* is then translated as reason, mind, *raison*, meaning [Sinn], *logos*.

Yet *Tao* could be the way that gives all ways [*der alles be-wëgende Weg*], the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, meaning, *logos* properly mean to say – properly, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in the word “way,” *Tao*, if only we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are capable of this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of today’s reign of method also, and indeed preeminently, stems from the fact that the methods, notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of a great hidden stream which moves [*be-wëgt*] all things along and makes way for everything. All is way.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” p. 85. This sentence has been omitted in Peter D. Herz’s translation. Here is its original version in German: “‘*Sinnan*’ bedeutet ursprünglich: reisen, streben nach... eine Richtung einschlagen; die indogermanische Wurzel *sent* und *set* bedeutet Weg.” (Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe I, Band 12*), S 49.

<sup>31</sup> Joan Stambaugh, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,” pp. 84-86.

<sup>32</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, p. 92; Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe I, Band 12*, S 187. German-text interpolations added.

The statement that ‘the word “way” probably is a primal word that speaks to the reflective mind of man’ is basically what the present inquiry endeavors to investigate and assert here, namely, that *thinking* is a kind of *waying*. Likewise, the claim that ‘because we are prone to think of “way” superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our word “way” has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what *Tao* says’ explains the more abstract choices of rendering *Tao* as ‘reason, mind, *raison*, meaning, *logos*’. These choices align with the dominant sense of *truth* in the Western epistemic tradition as “*adaequatio intellectūs et rei*,” or as accordance of knowledge or intellect to matter, which in non-theological terms becomes “the accordance (*homoiōsis*) of a statement (*logos*) with a matter (*pragma*),”<sup>33</sup> and which prevents the rendition of the ineffable *Tao* along the epistemic tangibility of the metaphors of the ‘way’. By contrast, Heidegger suggests that it is rather *Tao*, the ‘way’, that provides ‘the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, meaning, *logos* properly mean to say’, something that we could find out ‘if only we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken.’ In this sense, ‘the enigmatic power of today’s reign of method’ can be seen as being ‘merely the runoff of a great hidden stream which moves all things’, just as the stream of the unspeakable *Tao* does – the stream that ensures that ‘all is way’.

We can note here that Heidegger’s discussion *Tao* renders it along the metaphors of ‘way’ and associates ‘thinking’ with the above indicated meanings of *wēgen*, *Be-wēgung*, and *Sinnan*. Additionally, *Tao*, which “is beyond the power of words,”<sup>34</sup> can also be seen as connoting the indeterminate sense of the ‘woodpath’ (*Hozlweg*), as well as the indefinite sense of the meaning of Being.<sup>35</sup> At the very least, Lao-tse *Tao* and Heidegger’s *Weg* appear to have the affinity of ineffability, even if the fundamental sense of Lao-tse’s *Tao* may be more suggestive of Heidegger’s *Being*.<sup>36</sup> Thus, Heidegger’s discussion of *Tao* has put it once again to the fore that, as a whole, his later metaphors of the ‘way’ very acutely apperceives our reflective activity of ‘thinking’. And, if in this sense thinking is waying, that is, always on the way, and on the way to language, the same is also true of the fundamental inquiry into the meaning of Being, as well as of all philosophizing.

### 3. Heidegger’s early metaphors of ‘home’

Heidegger makes his first significant employment of metaphors of ‘home’ (*Heim*, *Haus*) in *Being and Time*. His early ‘home’ related vocabulary is diverse and suggestive as a whole, playing a key role in his existential analytic of *Dasein*, and specifically – in bringing to the fore

<sup>33</sup> Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” pp. 116-120; Martin Heidegger, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” SS 178-182.

<sup>34</sup> *The Way of Life, According to Lao Tzu*, translated by Witter Bynner (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1986), Ch. 1.

<sup>35</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), pp. 21ff; *Sein und Zeit*, SS 2ff. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 2ff; *Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Band 40* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1983), SS 2ff.

<sup>36</sup> See Rossen Roussev, “Global Conversation on the Spot: What Lao-tse, Heidegger, and Rorty have in Common,” *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. I, No. 01 (2018), pp. 11-38.

the existential motivation for Dasein's thinking and philosophizing. Heidegger's central term here is *unheimlich*, rendered in English as *uncanny*, and it comes into play in his discussion of Dasein's Being as 'care' (*Sorge*), and more specifically – of 'anxiety' (*Angst*) as Dasein's basic 'state of mind' (*Befindlichkeit*).

For Heidegger, "in anxiety one feels 'uncanny'," whereas "'uncanniness' [*Unheimlichkeit*] also means 'not-being-at-home' [*Nicht-zuhause-sein*]" – in contradistinction from 'Being-at-home' [*Zuhause-sein*], which stands for Dasein's "tranquillized self-assurance" in the world of its "average everydayness" marked by the "publicness of the 'they'."<sup>37</sup> In this sense, he also maintains that Dasein's basic state of "anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'," individualizes it, and places it in "the existential 'mode' of the 'not-at-home' [*Unzuhause*]."<sup>38</sup> As Heidegger sees it, "from an existential-ontological point of view," compared to the "tranquillized and familiar" *at-home* of Being-in-the-world in everydayness, the *not-at-home* is the more primordial mode, which means that the former is an element of the later, and not vice versa.<sup>39</sup> Thus, in his view, "uncanniness" is "the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed," placing it "face to face with the 'nothing' of the world," such that Dasein experiences "anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."<sup>40</sup>

Heidegger also links the uncanny Dasein in anxiety with the peculiar 'call of conscience', which makes possible Dasein's own projection 'upon its own potentiality-for-Being' [*eigenste Seinkönnen*],

Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls. The 'it calls me' ["*es ruft mich*"] is a distinctive kind of discourse for Dasein. The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have hitherto merely contended; that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.<sup>41</sup>

The call of conscience that enables Dasein 'to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being' is triggered in uncanniness. The latter is a 'threat' to Dasein's 'lostness' in everydayness but it thus provides Dasein with the possibility for its authentic existence. The call, which comes 'out of the depth' of 'Dasein itself', reveals Dasein to itself as 'conscience'. Conscience for its part is revealed as the 'call of care' and as what ensures Dasein's knowledge and understanding:

The call is the call of care. Being-guilty [*Schuldigsein*] constitutes the Being to which we give the name of "care". In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this entity face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. To the extent that for Dasein, as care, its Being is an issue, it summons itself as a "they" which is factually falling, and summons itself from its uncanniness towards its potentiality-for-Being.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), p. 233; *Sein und Zeit*, SS 188-189.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 233; SS 188-189.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234; S 189.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 321; S 276.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322; S 277.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333; SS 286-287.

Understanding the call discloses one's own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization. The uncanniness which is revealed in understanding and revealed along with it, becomes genuinely disclosed by the state-of-mind of anxiety which belongs to that understanding. The fact of the *anxiety of conscience* gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness.<sup>43</sup>

For Heidegger, 'the call of conscience' is 'the call of care'; it is the call of 'Guilty!' and of 'Being-guilty', which is 'given the name care'. It comes out of the 'uncanniness' of Dasein as facing 'its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being'. It is a call that 'summons' Dasein out of the 'falling' in which it is unindividualized as 'they' and directs it 'towards its potentiality-for-Being'.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, 'understanding the call discloses one's own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization', and discloses it in 'the state-of-mind of anxiety'. Whereas 'the anxiety of conscience' attests that Dasein is in the face of 'its own uncanniness'.

Early Heidegger's metaphors of 'home' could also be detected, even if not without stipulations, in some rather trivial usages as well. Thus the German expression 'von Hause aus' (literally 'from the house out' but most typically used to mean 'originally' or 'innately') appears to point to a certain essential fundamentality in the meaning of the 'house', even though it may remain transparent or void of any other significance in reading and translation. In the above mentioned English translations, it has been rendered mostly 'by its very nature', but also 'fundamentally', 'from the outset', 'from the very beginning'.<sup>45</sup> Interestingly, the last two renditions translate the German phrase as emphatically placed in quotation marks by Heidegger himself, when he claims that Dasein's capacity to "'find' that something is missing [fehlt]" is intrinsically tied with whether Dasein "were *awaiting*" that 'something' "from the outset."<sup>46</sup> Given the prevalent terminological usages of Heidegger's early 'home' metaphors, which in essence convey Dasein's capacity to disclose the world in uncanniness, this usage here can now be seen as a non-trivial one – as pointing to the character and essence of Dasein as a being for which the disclosure of the world (viz. the meaning of Being) is a concern 'from the outset', and equally – an 'out-of-house' concern, or a concern of 'uncanniness'.

As a whole, the metaphors of 'home' in Heidegger's early thought carries the sense of the fundamental condition for Dasein's thinking and philosophizing. His concept of *uncanniness*, which characterizes Dasein's Being as care, points to the primary existential impulse that sets in motion Dasein's understanding of itself, its disclosure of the world, and its other workings. And, whereas *uncanniness*, as the existential feeling of 'not-at-home', may prompt an inauthentic search for the 'at-home' of the world of everyday concern of the 'they', it is also what opens Dasein to, and eventually triggers its ensuing search for, 'its ownmost potentiality-

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 342; SS 295-296.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. "Hearing the appeal correctly is ... tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, to projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty." Ibid., pp. 333-334; S 287.

<sup>45</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), pp. 81, 171, 213, 407, 467; *Being and Time* (1996), pp. 52, 125, 158, 325, 380); *Sein und Zeit*, SS 55, 133, 169, 355, 414.

<sup>46</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), p. 407; *Sein und Zeit*, S 355.

for-Being'. It thus opens the possibility for Dasein's authentic concern with Being, which at bottom motivates all its thinking and philosophizing – about itself as an existential subject and about its relation to the world.

#### 4. Heidegger's later metaphors of 'home'

In his later thought, Heidegger links the metaphors of 'home' to thinking and philosophizing more directly. Already in his lectures from 1929-1930, he quotes a statement by Novalis: "Philosophy is really homesickness (*Heimweh*), an urge to be at home (*zu Hause zu sein*) everywhere."<sup>47</sup> Heidegger then elaborates,

Philosophy can only be such an urge if we who philosophize are not at home [*nicht zu Hause*] everywhere ... Not merely here or there, nor even simply in every place, in all places taken together one after another. Rather, to be at home [*zu Hause*] everywhere means to be at once and at all times within the whole. We name this '*within the whole*' and its character of wholeness the *world*.<sup>48</sup>

Heidegger offers his own reading of Novalis' statement here: philosophy would be 'an urge to be at home everywhere' if we are 'not at home' already. For him, 'everywhere' here means neither 'every place', nor 'all places taken together one after another'; it means 'to be at once and at all times within the whole'; that is, within 'the world'. Heidegger's point is that our 'not at home' motivates us to aspire 'to be at home', that 'philosophizing' begins with 'not at home' and goes on searching for 'home'; but it does not just search for a home or homes within the world – it searches 'to be at home' *with* 'the world' or 'to be at home' *within the world as a whole*. In this sense, he thinks that "what Novalis names *homesickness* is ultimately the *fundamental attunement* [*Grundstimmung*] of philosophizing."<sup>49</sup> Thus, like the 'not-at-home' of the *uncanniness* of Dasein in *Being and Time*, the 'not-at-home' of *homesickness* here is seen as providing the primary impulse for any thinking and philosophizing, but now Heidegger seems to make more directly the suggestion that any adequate thinking and philosophizing needs to awaken it and maintain it in the pursuit of its ends.<sup>50</sup>

In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger continues his usage of the metaphors of 'home' – most significantly by a new discussion of *uncanniness*, which could be seen as a peculiar expansion of the one that we know from his magnum opus. More particularly, he offers his own reading of the first ode of the choir of Sophocles' *Antigone*,<sup>51</sup> in which he translates the Greek word *deinon* (δεινόν) as 'uncanny' and identifies it as the most fundamental aspect of the human condition,

<sup>47</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 5; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), S 7.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5; SS 7-8.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9; S 12.

<sup>50</sup> For an insightful discussion of Novalis' *Heimweh*, which can also be translated as 'nostalgia', see Tomokazu Baba, "Philosophy as Journey," *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. II, No. 01 (2019), pp. 12-14.

<sup>51</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 156ff; *Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Band 40*, SS 155ff.

Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing  
uncannier than man bestir itself, rising up beyond him.

Heidegger sees the ode as depicting the human being as “the uncanniest of the uncanny” and as becoming such in the face of the “overwhelming sway” of beings as a whole.<sup>52</sup> He identifies two key senses of *deinon* – ‘terrible’ and ‘violent’, which he sees as transposed within the relation of the human and the sway, as well as as applying to both of them. As he puts it, “the *deinon* is the terrible in the sense of the overwhelming sway, which induces panicked fear, true anxiety, as well as collected, inwardly, reverberating, reticent awe”; whereas “the violent [*das Gewaltige*], the overwhelming [*das Überwältigende*] is the essential character of the sway [*Walten*] itself.”<sup>53</sup> For its part, “humanity is *deinon*” both in the sense that it “is exposed to” the terror of the “overwhelming sway” and in the sense that it is “violence-doing.”<sup>54</sup> But while the uncanny character of humanity is a response to the terror and violence of the overwhelming sway, “because it is doubly *deinon*..., it [humanity] is to *deinotaton*, the most violent: violence-doing in the midst of the overwhelming.”<sup>55</sup> Thus, humanity is seen as *uncanny* (indeed ‘the uncanniest of the uncanny’) in the two identified senses of *deinon*, namely, ‘terrible’ and ‘violent’ (indeed ‘the most violent’), whereas its uncanniness is transposed along its relation with the ‘overwhelming sway’ of beings as a whole and is at once provider and receiver of both ‘violence’ and ‘terror’.

It must be clarified, though, that for Heidegger the *uncanny* is not “an impression made on our emotional states”; it is instead “that which throws one out of the ‘canny’, that is, the homely, the accustomed, the usual, the unendangered.”<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, it is not a “particular property” that we assign “as if the human were something else in addition”; it is “the basic trait of the human essence, into which every other trait must always be drawn.”<sup>57</sup> It is thus not surprising that Heidegger will claim that “the saying ‘the human being is the uncanniest’ provides the authentic Greek definition of humanity.”<sup>58</sup> This claim aligns with his previous position that *uncanniness* is the primary impulse for any thinking and philosophizing, as well as that ‘the human essence’, as marked by its ‘uncanniness’, is to be singled out as the being which concerns itself with Being.

For the purpose of this paper, I shall draw attention to one more discussion of the metaphors of ‘home’ in Heidegger’s later thought, which comes from the fourth volume of his *Nietzsche*. In a remarkable passage there, he dwells on “homelessness” (*Heimatlosigkeit*) and “homecoming” (*Heimkehr*) as the modes of Being of historical humanity that motivate and delimit all its putative success and essentialist searches,

The unfamiliarity of beings as such brings to light the homelessness of historical man within beings as a whole. The “where” of a dwelling in the midst of beings as such seems obliterated, because the Being itself, as the essential occurring of every abode, fails to appear.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 159; SS 158-159.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 159-160; SS 158-159.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 160; S 159.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 160; S 159.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 161; S 160.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 161; S 160.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 161; S 160.

The partly conceded, partly denied homelessness of man with regard to his *essence* is replaced by the organized global conquest of the earth, and the thrust into outer space. Homeless man – thanks to the success of his management and ordering of ever great numbers of his kind – lets himself be driven into flight in the face of his own essence, only to represent this flight to himself as a homecoming to the true humanity of *homo humanus*, and to make humanity part of his own enterprise.<sup>59</sup>

As in Heidegger's discussion of *uncanniness* in *Being and Time*, here 'the unfamiliarity of beings as such' is also linked to the 'homelessness' of historical humanity in the face of 'beings as a whole'. In the state of 'homelessness', every 'where' remains 'obliterated', as 'Being itself', what is necessary for any knowledge and familiarity, 'fails to appear'. At the same time, the 'homelessness' of humanity is seen as compensated via 'organized global conquest of the earth' and the cosmic space, which for Heidegger is a result of the 'homeless' humanity facing its 'own essence'. This peculiar, compensating 'flight' of humanity to itself he now calls straightforwardly *homecoming*. In his view, this is a 'homecoming' which humanity tends to 'represent' as homecoming to its own 'true' essence, and thus to see itself as 'part of its own enterprise'. And though humanity in this way may lose itself into beings, (for the more it "requires beings, the less it craves for being as such" and is "even less inclined to heed Being itself"),<sup>60</sup> *homecoming* is for Heidegger still the enterprise that marks its *way*, as a way out of its *homelessness*.

Heidegger's latter metaphors of 'home' is linked to that of *Being and Time* in that it plays a key part in conveying the existential motivation for the self-discovery and the workings of the existential subject. In essence, it is a continuation of the usage of his earlier 'home' related metaphors, which is now elaborated along its relationship to *philosophizing*, a discussion of the notion of *deinon* in the ancient Greek culture, and the introduction of the notions of *homelessness* and *homecoming*. At this point, we can note that Heidegger's notion of *homecoming* appears to be most conspicuously indicative of the relation between his metaphors of 'way' and that of 'home', whose aptness for the characterization of our reflective activities of thinking and philosophizing we seek to demonstrate here.

For additional support to the claim that *thinking* and *philosophizing* can be fittingly represented within the metaphors of *waying* and *homecoming*, I now turn to Lao-tse's *Tao Te Ching*.

### 5. Lao-tse's concepts of *Tao* and *Te*

It is nothing less of remarkable that a very similar sense of *waying* and *homecoming* in relation to *thinking* and *philosophizing* can be isolated in the classic of *Tao Te Ching*, whose authorship has been most commonly attributed to Lao-tse. I shall focus here on its two main concepts, *Tao* (道) and *Te* (德), as well as on their relation,<sup>61</sup> aiming to identify aspects of their senses that attune with those of the above discussed metaphors of Heidegger's.

<sup>59</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volumes III and IV*, edited by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), Vol. IV, p. 248; *Nietzsche, Bd. II* (Phullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1961), SS 394-395.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248; S 395.

<sup>61</sup> For a more detailed discussion of *Tao* and *Te*, as well as of other related aspects of the philosophical perspective of *Laozi*, see Rossen Roussev, "Global Conversation on the Spot: What Lao-tse, Heidegger, and Rorty Have in



Most generally, in *Laozi*, *Tao* is understood as the ‘way’ of all existence and *Te* as standing for each existing being’s adherence to that ‘way’. The sense that we get for *Tao* from the classic is that it remains “beyond the power of words” and thus could be rendered only as *wu* (無) or ‘nothing’.<sup>62</sup> Despite its essential nothingness, *Tao* is understood as the source of all existence via its first more specific upshot – the creative power *Qi* (氣). Furthermore, *Tao* is understood as designating the harmony and balance of all there is – that is, all beings – via the two opposing powers *Yin* (陰) and *Yang* (陽), which are the first creations of *Qi*.<sup>63</sup> *Tao* is also fundamentally the ‘way’ of *Te*; that is, it is the ‘way’ of each being’s individual partaking in the harmony of *Tao*, including in the case of the human being – of one’s individual existence, of one’s mind and body, of one’s thinking and living.<sup>64</sup>

For its part, *Te*, which has been typically translated as “virtue” but also as “at the core of life” (Bynner), “[Tao’s] outflowing operation” (Legge), “particular efficacy” and “character” (Ames and Hall),<sup>65</sup> has the sense of one’s diligent maintaining of one’s individual relation to *Tao* and becomes particularly pressing in the case of an eventual loss of *Tao*. In practice, this means that its role is to dispel all strife and tension, which would be indicative of the loss of *Tao*, by an effortless action, *we-wei* (無爲), that ensures one’s return to *Tao*, viz. one’s harmonious and peaceful co-existence along the rest of the world. *Te* is thus the constant actualization of *Tao* in one’s individual existence and is one’s individual way and end within the eternal harmony of *Tao*. In this its sense, and from a slightly different angle, *Te* can be also seen as a localized manifestation of *Tao*,<sup>66</sup> which “denotes this vital potency for life” that finds its way in the cultivation of the individual nurtured beings.<sup>67</sup>

We can now focus on how this understanding of *Laozi*’s notions of *Tao* and *Te* relates to the Heideggerian terminology that was previously discussed. On my reading, each of the two key terms of the classic can be seen as accumulating in one way or another the senses of Heidegger’s metaphors of both ‘way’ and ‘home’. This, of course, will need to be shown, but it is largely due to the multifaceted senses of *Tao* and *Te*, which are at once general and open-ended enough to match and accommodate a good many of Heidegger’s onto-phenomenological

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Common,” *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), pp. 11-38.

<sup>62</sup> *The Way of Life, According to Lao Tzu*, translated by Witter Bynner (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1986), Ch. 1; cf. *Daodejing, “Making This Life Significant,” A Philosophical Translation*, English and Mandarin Chinese Edition, translated and with commentary by Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), Ch. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Lao Zi, *Dao De Jing*, translated by Bruce R. Linnell (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018), Ch. 42; Rudolf G. Wagner, *A Chinese reading of the Daodejing: Wang Bi’s Commentary on the Laozi with Critical Text and Translation* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), Ch. 42; Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Ch. 42.

<sup>64</sup> Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, translated by Stephen Mitchell (London: Frances Lincoln Ltd., 2015), Ch. 54; Bruce R. Linnell, Ch. 54; Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Ch. 54.

<sup>65</sup> Lao Tsu, *Tao Te Ching*, translated by Feng, Gia-Fu & Jane English, Vintage Books (New York, New York, 1989), Ch. 51; *The Way of Life, According to Lao Tzu*, Ch. 10; *The Tao Teh King, or The Tao and its Characteristics*, in *The Sacred Books of China: The Texts of Taoism*, translated by James Legge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), Ch. 51; *Daodejing, “Making This Life Significant,” A Philosophical Translation*, Ch. 51, Ch. 54.

<sup>66</sup> Rossen Roussev, “Global Conversation on the Spot: What Lao-tse, Heidegger, and Rorty Have in Common,” p. 18.

<sup>67</sup> Thomas Michael, *The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), p. 63.

projections. In this sense, whereas the multifacetedness of the key terms of *Laozi* does not allow for their strict one-for-one rendition in Heideggerian vocabulary, it does allow us to seek a credible projection of the perspective of the short ancient classic into that of the multivolume work of the 20th-century thinker, even as his terms may be seen as converging within fewer terms of the classic.

Thus, it can be immediately noticed that, if *Tao* is understood as the ‘way’ of the harmony of all existence (and so also of coexistence) for each thing and every individual, and is thus understood as the way to be followed in a most general sense, *Tao* can be likewise also understood as the ‘way of thinking’. We need to make it clear, though, that along *Tao*’s all-inclusiveness ‘way of thinking’ here accumulates not only Heidegger’s early sense of a non-methodical ‘way’ which needs to be gone ‘all the way’ and to keep the existential subject continuously ‘underway’, but also his later more nuanced understanding of ‘way’. As we already saw, in its ineffability and essential nothingness, *Tao* remains as indeterminate as Heidegger’s later metaphor for thinking – the *woodpath* (with its unclear and abrupt end). This is so even when the particular beings come to terms with *Tao* in *Te*, because these beings can only be elements of *Tao*’s harmony, and in no way its determination; for they are in a way secondary, as they “came out of the womb of the matter.”<sup>68</sup> Likewise, when actualized in its loss as a search in *Te* and thus within a particular way of thinking, *Tao* becomes almost literally ‘way-making’.<sup>69</sup> That is, *Tao* can be equally seen as including the later Heidegger’s choice of the old Alemannic-Swabian *Bewegung* as a metaphor for thinking as well. For us, this means that, even if *Laozi*’s *Tao* – in its ineffability and essential nothingness – appears to resemble more closely the character of Heidegger’s *Being* (that is, what for Heidegger underlays all thinking and philosophizing), its sense can be seen also as largely inclusive of that of Heidegger’s *way* of thinking. There should be no room for much surprise here – we are just prompted once again to Heidegger’s note that “the word ‘way’ probably is a primal word that speaks to the reflective mind of man.”<sup>70</sup>

Now, in addition to its sense of ‘way’, *Tao* can be seen also as the ‘home’ for all existence and coexistence. For, as *Tao* ensures the harmony of all there is along the opposing powers of *Yin* and *Yang*, it is also where the individual beings aim to return along their *Te*. We need to note here, though, that if *Tao* can readily accommodate Heidegger’s metaphors of both ‘way’ and ‘home’, this is in no way indicative of any discrepancy in the perspective of *Laozi*. On the contrary, as it was already pointed, the multifaceted sense of *Tao* allows it accommodate the senses of a large number of Heidegger’s terms in a consistent fashion, including the ones of his *way*, *Being*, *way of thinking*, *woodpath*, *way-making*, and *home*.

Similarly, the multifaceted sense of *Laozi*’s *Te* allows it too to consistently accommodate Heidegger’s metaphors of both ‘way’ and ‘home’ – *Te* can be seen as being at once both one’s *way* to and one’s *home* in the harmony of *Tao*. *Te* could be one’s individual *way* to *Tao* when it is actualized when *Tao* is lost; *Te* could be one’s *home* in the harmony of *Tao* when it

<sup>68</sup> Witter Bynner, Ch. 1.

<sup>69</sup> In fact, this is how it has been rendered in the purposely philosophical translation of Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall.

<sup>70</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, p. 92; cf. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe I, Band 12*, S 187.

upholds one's individual adherence to *Tao*. Indeed, to the extent that *Te* becomes pressing in a possible loss of *Tao*, an actualized *Te*, as a search for *Tao*, can be also seen as one's *waying* and *homecoming*. Furthermore, *Te*, as upholding one's individual relationship to *Tao*, would be responding to *Tao*'s essential nothingness, *wu*, with an effortless action, *wu-wei*, which would be indeed the right action that both ensures and marks one's adherence to the harmony of *Tao*. And finally, when actualized in the loss of *Tao* as the search for *Tao*, *Te* can be also seen as inclusive of the senses of both Novalis' *Heimweh* and the Greek *deinon*, which for the later Heidegger had the character of *uncanniness* that fundamentally motivates all our thinking and philosophizing.

Thus, in the perspective of the present investigation, we can conclude that, if when disturbed Lao-tse's harmony of *Tao* and Heidegger's 'at-home' of the existential subject can be addressed reflectively by way of, respectively, a diligent upholding of *Te* and a concerned search for *home*, (while the identification of *wu-wei* as the "Taoist equivalent" of Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* or 'releasement' still stands),<sup>71</sup> the parallel between the two thinkers in understanding thinking and philosophizing as *waying* and *homecoming* will be essentially complete.

### 6. Herodotus' metaphoric of 'journey'

The last point that I would like to bring here in support of the view that thinking and philosophizing can be aptly apperceived within the metaphoric of *waying* and *homecoming* comes from the dawn of the Western philosophical tradition and, more specifically, from the context of the first record of a conjoined usage of *philos* (φίλος), and *sophia* (σοφία), which is found in Herodotus' *Histories*. In their independent usage, the Greek word *philos*, which comes from the verb *philein* (φιλεῖν) most commonly translated as 'to love', had the meanings of 'loved', 'beloved', 'loving', 'dear' and 'friend', whereas *sophia*, most commonly translated as 'wisdom', more originally had the meaning of 'skill' and 'ability to do something well'. In his *Histories*, Herodotus uses the verb *philosophēin* (φιλοσοφεῖν) broadly in the sense of love to learn, (which indeed comprises both existential and epistemic meanings), and links it to *traveling* across the world "for the sake of seeing various lands."<sup>72</sup> In a scene describing a meeting at the Ancient city of Sardis between the Athenian legislator Solon and the king of Lydia Croesus the latter is said to have said,

ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπῖκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἶνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφῶν γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίας εἶνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας.<sup>73</sup>

On A.D. Godlay's translation this is rendered as,

Our Athenian guest, we have heard much of you, by reason of your wisdom and your wanderings, how that you have travelled far to seek knowledge and to see the world.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Joan Stambaugh, "Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics," p. 85.

<sup>72</sup> Herodotus, *The History Of Herodotus*, translated by G. C. Macaulay (London and New York: MacMillan and Co., 1890), I, 30.

<sup>73</sup> *Herodotus*, Volumes I and II, translated by A.D. Godlay (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1975), I, 30.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 30.

On Macaulay's translation it is,

Athenian guest, much report of thee has come to us, both in regard to thy wisdom and thy wanderings, how that in thy search for wisdom thou hast traversed many lands to see them.<sup>75</sup>

On Tom Holland's translation,

We have heard a good deal about you, my guest from Athens: you have a reputation as a wise and well-travelled man, as a philosopher indeed, one who has travelled the world and always kept his eyes wide open.<sup>76</sup>

On Gregory Nagy's translation,

Athenian guest [*xenos*], we have heard much about your wisdom [*sophiā*] and your wandering [*planē*], how you in your love of wise things [*philosopheîn*] have traveled all over the world for the sake of a sacred journey [*theōriā*]...<sup>77</sup>

We can note here that the usage of *philosopheîn* in Herodotus is rendered different in translations, not least because it is still far removed from the later, markedly speculative, sense of 'philosophize'. Herodotus' sense appears to be suggestive of a simple love to learn or a natural desire to find out something previously unknown, something that may not be specific, or something of which we may not have any clues at all. One thing about this usage is clear, though: philosophizing in this early sense is linked to 'wanderings', 'seeing', and 'traveling' throughout the 'world'.<sup>78</sup>

In the perspective of the present investigation, it is important to note that *philosopheîn* is most immediately associated with *θεωρία* (*theōriā*) or 'seeing'. In fact, while the Greek *sophia* is of unknown origin, there is a strong etymological connection between 'wisdom' and 'seeing' in other Western languages. Thus, the German *Weisheit* and the English *wisdom* are traceable to the Proto-Indo-European root *weid-* meaning 'to see', to which are also traceable some of the senses of the German *Weise* and the English *way*.<sup>79</sup> In this sense, whereas the associations of both *philosopheîn* with *theōriā* and 'wisdom' with 'seeing' can be considered clear pointers to the sense of the 20th century's phenomenological reflection, (about which Heidegger himself has had much to say),<sup>80</sup> they are also key indications of what I am trying to demonstrate here, namely, that thinking and philosophizing can be aptly apperceived in the metaphors of *waying* and *homecoming*. In this regard, Nagy's rendition of *theōriā* as 'a sacred journey' appears to be most suggestive, as the sense of 'journey' is inclusive of those of 'waying' and 'homecoming'. In this sense, *journey* can be seen as holding together *waying* and

<sup>75</sup> Herodotus, *The History Of Herodotus*, I, 30.

<sup>76</sup> Herodotus, *The Histories*, translated by Tom Holland (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), I, 30.

<sup>77</sup> Gregory Nagy, *The Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 628.

<sup>78</sup> See also Tomokazu Baba, "Philosophy as Journey," pp. 9-10.

<sup>79</sup> <https://www.etymonline.com>.

<sup>80</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962), pp. 49ff, *Sein und Zeit*, SS 17ff.

*homecoming* in an inseparable unity – the unity which defines *philosophizing* most fundamentally as *journey*, and indeed the *journey of waying and homecoming*.

We can exemplify this point by a slight expansion of the context here – the usage of *philosophēin* on Herodotus' account is made in a discussion on the meaning of happiness, in which the affluent and powerful Lydian king was hoping to be confirmed as “the happiest of men” by the “wisdom” of the well-traveled Athenian legislator.<sup>81</sup> That Solon's wisdom surprised and did not actually satisfy the king is perhaps a cliché, (though one that may be well worth considering); but that it was gathered in a *journey* across the world is a finding that is germane and well-fitting within our discussion here. In its primordial usage, *philosophy* is seen as a *journey* all along *waying* and *homecoming*.

### 7. In conclusion

The above discussion of Heidegger's *way*- and *home*-related vocabularies, Lao-tse's notions of *Tao* and *Te*, and Herodotus' association of *philosophēin* and *theōriā* was meant to demonstrate the aptness of the metaphors of ‘way’, ‘home’, and ‘journey’ for apperceiving our reflective activities of thinking and philosophizing. This aptness was initially detected within the respective perspectives of thought of each of these three authors, but was also traced in a cross-perspectival fashion – along their interlinkage in the perspective of the present investigation. By way of conclusion, I shall now briefly summarize the interlinks of these metaphors and the way they recapture *thinking and philosophizing as the journey of waying and homecoming*.

In Heidegger's early work *Being and Time*, the metaphors of ‘way’ is traceable along a wide range of his usage of the German language, in which it enters the role of a carrier of the fundamentals of the existential analytic of *Dasein*. More specifically, it conveys the epistemic aspect of the existential dynamics of *Dasein* presenting the latter as being that in all its workings is constantly ‘underway’; it also plays a key part in Heidegger's discussion of time, which is an intrinsic element of that dynamics. It is important to note that for early Heidegger the sense of the term ‘way’ is different from that of method for multiple application, even if it is essentially related to *Dasein*'s epistemic and ontological concerns. Instead, it is more akin to that of a ‘journey’ which can be completed only if one is able to go through it ‘all the way’. In this sense, thinking and philosophizing in Heidegger's early thought reappear as a kind of epistemic journey, which is always unique on its own and which can only be completed by going all the way along it.

In Heidegger's later work, the metaphors of ‘way’ is much more nuanced, even as its association with epistemic journey remains intact. With the metaphor of the ‘woodpath’, Heidegger has suggested that a ‘way’ is created by going along it and that it is thus a way with an unknown end. In this sense, ‘thinking’ is understood as ‘questioning’ and as ‘going along the way’, whereas the ‘way’ is understood as ‘way of thinking’. Heidegger has also associated ‘thinking’ with ‘clearing a way’, which suggests once again that ‘thinking’ is creating a way (its own way), and additionally – that it is maintaining it. Furthermore, he has traced the sense of the ‘call’ of ‘what calls for thinking’ to that of ‘setting in motion’ and ‘getting underway’, and has also identified it as a non-demanding but rather inviting and letting one reach one's destination. In this sense, he has also discussed the old German word *Sinnan* (‘to travel, to strive

<sup>81</sup> Herodotus, *The History Of Herodotus*, I, 30.

after, ... to take a certain direction'), which is an element of the etymology of the German and Latin words for meaning and reflection, and which points to a common semantic genealogy of the words for thinking and traveling that is traceable to the Proto-Indo-European *sent* or *set* meaning 'way'. Finally, in a discussion of the ancient Chinese notion of *Tao*, Heidegger has pointed to the inadequacies of rendering its sense in Western languages as 'reason, mind, *raison*, meaning, *logos*', suggesting instead that it is rather *Tao*, which literally means 'way', that provides 'the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, meaning, *logos* properly mean to say'. Thus, Heidegger's elaborations on the metaphors of 'way' in his later thought too point – and in various ways – to the intrinsic relation between 'way' and 'thinking', and ultimately affirm once again the former as a fitting metaphor for apperception of the latter.

Heidegger's early metaphors of 'home' is associated with the fundamental existential condition for Dasein's thinking and philosophizing. Its central term *uncanniness* has come to stand for the basic existential impulse that sets 'in motion' and 'on the way' Dasein's understanding of itself and its disclosure of the world. For Heidegger, *uncanniness* is the existential feeling of 'not-at-home', which may prompt an inauthentic search for the 'at-home' in the world of everydayness associated with the 'they'. And yet, it may also open Dasein to 'its ownmost potentiality-for-Being' and thus to the possibility for Dasein's authentic concern with Being, which is the fundamental epistemic concern that underlies all its thinking and philosophizing.

Heidegger's latter metaphors of 'home' is again associated with the primary impulse of the existential subject for its both self-discovery and disclosure of the world. In substance, it is a continuation of his earlier usage of 'home' related vocabulary but is now elaborated on along its relationship to *philosophizing*, a discussion of the notion of *deinon* in Sophocles, and the introduction of the tropes of *homelessness*, *homesickness*, and *homecoming*. Here, the term *homecoming*, which specifies 'the flight' of thinking and philosophizing that originate in uncanniness, has a special significance for us, as it appears most obviously to be bridging the metaphors of 'way' and that of 'home'. In *homecoming*, waying, thinking, and philosophizing converge into an intrinsic unity, which Heidegger sought to uncover and bring forward throughout his philosophy by making use of the two metaphors in focus here.

It must have become also already clear that the metaphors of *way* and that of *home*, both of which persist throughout Heidegger's thought, are inevitably linked with one another. Most generally, we can see their connection in that terms such as *uncanniness*, *homelessness*, and *homesickness* stand for what sets the existential subject *in motion* or *on the way*, which is essentially a *way to home*. In the philosophical thinking of Heidegger, the metaphors of 'way' offers recognizable terms for connecting the structural elements of the epistemic aspect of the dynamics of the existential subject, whereas that of 'home' offers ones that bring to light the primary existential condition for that dynamics. But not only are the metaphors of 'way' and that of 'home' inherently linked to one another, they also aptly convey and ensure the understanding of thinking and philosophizing in Heidegger's both early and later thought. Within their terms, thinking and philosophizing can be apperceived as *waying* and *homecoming*. That is, they can be apperceived as and along the *way* of an epistemic *journey*, which is always unique and which unfolds along the *uncanniness*, *homesickness*, *homelessness*, *the search for home*, and *homecoming* of the existential subject.

Heidegger's apperception of thinking and philosophizing as waying and homecoming is also fittingly complemented by *Laozi's* perspective on *Tao* and *Te*. Most generally, *Tao*, which literally means 'way', is understood as the ineffable source of, and generally the 'way' to be followed by, all existence and harmony; whereas *Te* is the principle of one's individual relation and adherence to *Tao*, which become particularly pressing if *Tao* is lost. It is important to note here that the senses of these concepts are multifaceted and that, whereas this may have made them difficult to translate, it has also enabled them to carry the senses of multiple terms of the philosophical perspective of the Western thinker. Thus, they can be both shown to host the senses of Heidegger's 'way' and 'home', even if in their own way. *Tao* can be seen at once as the 'way' and 'home' of all existence; *Te* – as the 'way' and 'home' of one's individual existence. In this sense, when *Te* is actualized in the case of a loss of *Tao*, the search for *Tao* in one's *Te* can be seen – as in the perspective of the present investigation – as the *journey* of one's *waying* and *homecoming*.

Finally, the apperception of thinking and philosophizing as waying and homecoming is also supported by the metaphors of 'journey' used in Herodotus' *Histories* in the context of the first recorded conjoined usage of *philos* and *sophia*. At the very dawn of the Western philosophical tradition, Herodotus uses the verb *philosopheîn* in the sense of love to learn, or desire to find out, in a close association with *theōriā* or 'seeing'. In the story of the meeting between Solon and Croesus he narrates, philosophizing in this early sense is linked to 'traveling for the sake seeing the world'. Now, as *theōriā* can also be translated as 'journey', it can also be seen as inclusive of the senses of 'waying' and 'homecoming', which are in our focus here. And as in this sense *philosophizing* is most fundamentally unveiled as *journey*, it can also be seen as the *journey of waying and homecoming*.